Gun Laws and Mental Illness: Ridding the Statutes of Stigma by McMahon, Susan
   
 
   
 
 
UNIVERSITY of PENNSYLVANIA 
JOURNAL of LAW & PUBLIC AFFAIRS 
 
 
Vol. 5 January 2020                                    No. 2 
 
GUN LAWS AND MENTAL ILLNESS: 
RIDDING THE STATUTES OF STIGMA 
 
Susan McMahon* 
 
A man takes aim at people gathered in a public place, killing large 
numbers of them. In the hours, days, and weeks to come, police, 
politicians, and the media insist that he must have been mentally ill. This 
presumed link between mental illness and violence is so unquestioned that 
it is enshrined in federal and state laws that prohibit people with mental 
illness from possessing guns. But this assumption is deeply wrong. 
This Article lays bare the lack of evidence connecting mental 
health conditions to violent acts and argues that mental illness gun bans 
do nothing more than reinforce the harmful trope that people living with 
a mental health condition are intrinsically dangerous. These laws, which 
prohibit people with certain indicia of mental health conditions from 
purchasing or possessing firearms, fail at their supposed goal of 
preventing guns from getting into the hands of dangerous people. They 
define the prohibited group in ways that both include many individuals 
who will never be violent and exclude many individuals who pose a risk. 
Moreover, this focus on mental illness distracts lawmakers from traits 
that better predict violence, such as past violent acts and substance 
abuse. 
The danger stigma has real consequences: It makes employers less 
likely to hire individuals with mental illness, landlords less likely to rent 
to them, and legislators less likely to allocate money to programs to serve 
them. It also makes police more likely to arrest or shoot them. 
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Because mental illness gun bans do not accomplish their goals and 
instead impose deep psychological and societal harms, they should be 
discarded in favor of laws that focus on stronger predictors of violence.  
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“I hope to hell that they find when they do the autopsy that 
there’s a tumor in his head or something,” Eric Paddock 
told reporters, “because if they don’t, we’re all in trouble.”1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
When Stephen Paddock took aim out the window of the Mandalay 
Bay Resort and Casino in Las Vegas, no medical professional had diagnosed 
him with a mental illness. Yet after he murdered fifty-nine attendees of a 
country music festival and injured over 800 others, police officers, journalists, 
and pundits all insisted that he must have had a mental health condition. 
In the hours after the shooting, the Las Vegas mayor called 
 
1 See Elif Batuman, Searching for Motives in Mass Shootings, NEW YORKER (Nov. 27, 
2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/searching-for-motives-in-mass-sh 
ootings [https://perma.cc/HPZ6-523D] (discussing Paddock’s brother, Stephen Paddock, who 
killed fifty-nine people in a shooting in Las Vegas). 
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Paddock a “crazed lunatic full of hate”;2 the sheriff in charge described 
him as a “psychopath.”3 
Days went by with no evidence that Paddock had a mental health 
condition, yet police continued to assume that his mind was unwell. “Las Vegas 
shooter Stephen Paddock likely had a severe mental illness that was probably 
undiagnosed,” read the first sentence in one story. 4 
No one could believe that mental health was not at the root of the 
murders. When a reporter asked the police department undersheriff if Paddock 
had shot these people simply because he could, the undersheriff answered: 
“That’s certainly a possibility but it’s one of those possibilities you really can’t 
wrap your mind around. I don’t know if I can accept that.”5  
The narrative of the dangerous lunatic prevails after nearly every mass 
shooting event, as evidenced by the public conversation in the wake of the recent 
shootings in El Paso, Texas and Dayton, Ohio. Political leaders immediately 
turned to mental health as a cause of such violence, without citing any evidence 
that either shooter suffered from a diagnosed mental health condition.6  
This search for a reason is all too human. We need motives when people 
commit bad acts so that we can understand what led them to do what they did 
and distance ourselves from it.7 When no motive makes itself apparent, the 
shooter must have been mentally ill. The alternative—that all humans are 
 
2 John Bacon & Mike James, Las Vegas Shooting: At Least 59 Dead, Gunman Was ‘Crazed 
Lunatic Full of Hate,’ USA TODAY (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/ 
nation/2017/10/02/las-vegas-shooting/722191001/ [https://perma.cc/HY28-LLND]. 
3 Lynh Bui et al., At Least 59 Killed in Las Vegas Shooting Rampage, More Than 500 Others 
Injured, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/ 
wp/2017/10/02/police-shut-down-part-of-las-vegas-strip-due-to-shooting/ [https://perma.cc/ 
H44W-83ND]. 
4  Jeff Farrell, Stephen Paddock: Investigators ‘Believe Las Vegas Shooter Had Severe 
Mental Illness That Was Likely Undiagnosed,’ INDEPENDENT (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www. 
independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/stephen-paddock-severe-mental-illness-undiagnosed 
-fbi-investigators-las-vegas-shooting-a7990021.html [https://perma.cc/S22Y-NS6S]. 
5 Id. 
6 See, e.g., Michael Crowley & Maggie Haberman, Trump Condemns White Supremacy but 
Stops Short of Major Gun Controls, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes. 
com/2019/08/05/us/politics/trump-speech-mass-shootings-dayton-el-paso.html [https://perma. 
cc/Q27C-NDZU] (quoting President Trump calling perpetrators of mass shootings “mentally 
ill monsters”); Susan Collins (@SenatorCollins), TWITTER (Aug. 4, 2019, 9:21 AM), 
https://twitter.com/SenatorCollins/status/1158198526574305280 [https://perma.cc/9S54-QU4E] 
(stating, in the wake of the Dayton, El Paso, and Gilroy shootings, “I have long supported 
closing loopholes in background checks to prevent the sale of firearms to . . . individuals 
with serious mental illness”).  
7 See, e.g., William Wan & Mark Berman, ‘I’m Constantly Asking: Why?’ When Mass 
Shootings End, the Painful Wait for Answers Begins., WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2018), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/national/im-constantly-asking-why-when-mass-shootings-end-
the-painful-wait-for-answers-begins/2018/03/15/6fb0347e-1d8a-11e8-b2d9-08e748f8 
92c0story.html [https://perma.cc/JN72-2DHP]. 
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capable of violence, and some are capable of it on a horrific scale, and we 
never know who is dangerous and who is not—is terrifying. 
Insisting that mental illness must be at the root of senseless, violent acts 
is both untrue (mental illness accounts for, at most, a tiny sliver of violent 
activity8) and stigmatizing.9 Nevertheless, this assumed connection has been 
enshrined in laws that ban the purchase or possession of firearms by people 
living with a mental illness.10 These mental illness gun bans do little to prevent 
violence and serve only to legitimate the false but widespread belief that 
individuals with mental illness are more dangerous than others.   
Scholars have previously recognized the ineffectiveness of laws 
restricting access to firearms by individuals living with mental health 
conditions11 and have suggested reforms designed to strengthen current laws.12 
This Article goes further. I argue that categorically denying individuals with 
mental illness access to guns does not reduce gun violence. Instead, such a ban 
legitimates the harmful and inaccurate trope that these individuals are 
dangerous. Because mental illness gun bans accomplish little and instead 
impose deep psychological and societal harms, they should be repealed.  
Moreover, a focus on mental health status distracts from better 
predictors of dangerousness—past violent acts or substance abuse. A no-
possession law tailored to these traits would more effectively protect the public 
without furthering the stigma against those living with mental health conditions.  
 This Article tackles these issues in five Parts. First, I discuss the 
myths and the realities of gun violence and mental illness. Because mass 
 
8 See infra Part I (discrediting the myth that mental illness is a predictor of violent behavior). 
9 See infra Part III (discussing the negative consequences of stigmatizing mental illness). 
10  See infra Part II (providing an overview of mental illness gun bans that have been 
implemented in many states). 
11 See, e.g., Laurie R. Martinelli, Separating Myth from Fact: Unlinking Mental Illness and 
Violence and Implications for Gun Control Legislation and Public Policy, 40 NEW ENG. J. 
ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 359, 369-70 (2014) (criticizing the “ineffective and 
inconsistent” mechanisms embedded in federal gun law). 
12 See, e.g., Jana R. McCreary, “Mentally Defective” Language in the Gun Control Act, 45 
CONN. L. REV. 813, 854-63 (2013) (arguing for reforms, such as requiring purchasers to 
present a certificate of mental health to purchase a gun, that would prevent the “dangerously 
mentally ill” from purchasing and possessing firearms); Katherine L. Record & Lawrence 
O. Gostin, A Robust Individual Right to Bear Arms Versus the Public’s Health: The Court’s 
Reliance on Firearms Restrictions on the Mentally Ill, 6 CHARLESTON L. REV. 371, 383 
(2012) (proposing reforms to federal law, including closing the gun show loophole for 
background checks and ensuring such checks are rapid and reliable); Fredrick E. Vars, 
Symptom-Based Gun Control, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1633, 1636-39 (2014) (discussing the 
weaknesses of current policies that restrict gun ownership and arguing for a “symptoms-
based approach” that allows a “police officer or mental health professional who observes an 
individual suffering from delusions or hallucinations . . . to confiscate that person’s firearms 
and to add that person’s name to the federal background check system”). 
Vol. 5:2] Gun Laws and Mental Illness  
 
   
 
5 
 
shootings drive most gun safety legislation, laying bare the relationship—or 
lack thereof—between these acts and mental illness is crucial to 
understanding the effectiveness of current gun laws. I further note that the 
relationship between mental illness and everyday gun violence, which takes 
a far greater toll in the United States than mass shootings, is even weaker than 
the purported links between mass shootings and mental illness. 
Second, I describe the details of the mental illness gun bans and 
show how they fail in their objective of preventing dangerous people from 
obtaining guns. 
Third, I illustrate the harm the dangerousness stigma does to people 
living with mental illness. These individuals are arrested at higher rates, have 
a difficult time finding housing and employment, and fail to obtain treatment 
because their condition has been stigmatized.  
 Fourth, I address the reasons why mental illness gun bans are so 
widespread. These laws seem like good policy on their face, and I grapple 
with their justifications and point out the flaws in the reasoning behind them.  
Fifth and finally, I point to other indicia of dangerousness that would 
both better achieve the goal of stemming gun violence in the United States 
and avoid stigmatizing individuals living with mental illness. 
 
I. GUN VIOLENCE AND MENTAL ILLNESS 
 
In the wake of a mass shooting, gun safety and gun rights advocates 
agree on little, but both sides acknowledge that guns should not be in the 
hands of “dangerous” people. 13  Almost without fail, the ranks of the 
 
13 For just one example of mental health as a conservative talking point, see, e.g., Ari 
Ne’eman, Trump Was Right to Lift a Rule Preventing Some People with Disabilities from 
Buying Guns, VOX (Feb. 19, 2018, 1:48 PM), https://www.vox.com/the-big-idea/ 
2017/2/6/14522132/gun-control-parkland-disabilities-republicans-nra-obama-liberty [https: 
//perma.cc/Q2BK-9KC4] (“After the horrific shootings in Parkland, Florida, last week, 
President Donald Trump said very little about gun policy—but quite a bit about mental 
health. This has become a common move for many in the GOP, who hope to deflect a 
growing wave of pressure for stronger gun control laws.”). Or, as a more inflammatory 
example, columnist Ann Coulter in the wake of the Sandy Hook shooting wrote an article 
titled, “Guns Don’t Kill People, the Mentally Ill Do.” Ann Coulter, Guns Don’t Kill People, 
The Mentally Ill Do, ANN COULTER (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.anncoulter.com/columns 
/2013-01-16.html [https://perma.cc/24SS-PV56]. 
For an example of progressive action on mental health after a mass shooting, see, e.g., OFFICE 
OF THE PRESS SEC’Y, THE WHITE HOUSE, FACT SHEET: NEW EXECUTIVE ACTIONS TO 
REDUCE GUN VIOLENCE AND MAKE OUR COMMUNITIES SAFER (2016), https://obamawhite 
house.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/01/04/fact-sheet-new-executive-actions-reduce-
gun-violence-and-make-our [https://perma.cc/F4Y8-PLEC] (outlining efforts to “increase 
mental health treatment and reporting to the background check system”). In the waning days 
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“dangerous” include individuals with mental illness.14 
This supposed connection between violence and mental illness is not 
solely the province of media pundits. Congress and the courts have also 
legitimized the connection. When the Supreme Court dismantled the District 
of Columbia’s handgun ban as unconstitutional under the Second 
Amendment, it noted that “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast 
doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by . . . the 
mentally ill.”15 When passing the federal Gun Control Act, which originally 
put a federal mental illness gun ban in place, one legislator stated, “No one can 
dispute the need to prevent . . . mental incompetents [and] persons with a history 
of mental disturbances . . . from buying, owning, or possessing firearms.”16  
These restrictions are not nearly as reasonable as the Court and 
Congress assumed.17 The supposed connection between mental illness and 
violence is cemented by media coverage, exploited by politicians, and 
embedded in our gun laws. It is also deeply false. 
 
of President Obama’s second term, the Social Security Administration finalized a rule to 
prevent gun purchases by individuals who receive Social Security disability benefits, have a 
mental disability, and use a representative payee for their benefit payments. Implementation 
of the NICS Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, 81 Fed. Reg. 91,702 (Dec. 19, 2016). 
Congress overturned the rule before it was scheduled to take effect. Providing for 
Congressional Disapproval Under Chapter 8 of Title 5, United States Code, of the Rule 
Submitted by the Social Security Administration Relating to Implementation of the NICS 
Improvement Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 115-8, 131 Stat. 15 (2017). 
14 The tide may be turning on this point in the wake of the El Paso shooting, after President 
Trump’s remarks linking mental illness and gun violence. Many media reports after the 
shooting questioned the assertion that mental illness caused violent acts, and the American 
Psychiatric Association and Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law both produced 
statements condemning the connection as unfounded. See, e.g., Nsikan Akpan, Why Mental 
Illness Can’t Predict Mass Shootings, PBS NEWSHOUR (Aug. 17, 2019, 8:12 PM), 
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/why-mental-illness-cant-predict-mass-shootings 
[https://perma.cc/VR3U-Y2FH] (arguing that psychological profiles cannot accurately 
predict mass shootings); Press Release, Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, APA Condemns Loss of Life 
from Gun Violence, Disputes Link to Mass Shootings (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www. 
psychiatry.org/newsroom/news-releases/apa-condemns-loss-of-life-from-gun-violence-dis-
putes-link-to-mental-illness [https://perma.cc/W2ZD-SKE2] (discrediting rhetoric that links 
gun violence to mental illness); Press Release, Judge David L. Bazelon Ctr. for Mental 
Health Law, Bazelon Center Statement on Recent El Paso, Texas and Dayton, Ohio 
Shootings (Aug. 5, 2019), http://www.bazelon.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/8-5-2019-
Bazelon-Center-Statement-on-El-Paso-TX-and-Dayton-OH-Shootings.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
K92L-SPDT] (condemning “the efforts of some to conflate hatred, bigotry and racism with 
mental illness”). 
15 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008). 
16 114 CONG. REC. 21,784 (1968) (statement of Rep. Celler). 
17 That said, I do not argue that these restrictions are prohibited under the Second Amendment. 
Such a conversation is outside the scope of this Article. Instead, my focus is on the normative 
value of these laws in light of the harm they cause individuals with mental illness. 
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The evidence instead shows that only a handful of the individuals who 
have committed mass shootings showed signs of mental illness beforehand. 
While in retrospect, we may want to categorize all of these individuals as 
“mentally ill”—and we think any reasonable definition of that term must 
include a person who would murder multiple strangers for no reason—very 
few of these perpetrators met the diagnostic criteria for a serious mental illness 
before the shooting. And even those who were diagnosed as mentally ill often 
had other signals in their background—past violent acts or substance abuse 
problems—that are more closely correlated with violence than mental illness. 
Regardless of mental health status, nearly every perpetrator of a 
mass shooting harbored resentment and extreme anger, which are better 
indicators of the individual’s propensity to commit this type of violence. 
In short, mental health status alone does not predict who will turn violent 
in an especially public way. 
When we broaden our lens to look past mass shootings, we find that 
the link between gun violence and individuals with mental illness weakens 
even further. Individuals living with a mental health condition are no more 
likely to be violent than their neighbors. 
 
A. The Myth 
 
Stephen Paddock had never been diagnosed with a mental illness 
when he shot and killed fifty-nine people at a music festival in Las Vegas.18 
Yet, when asked about motive, the sheriff leading the investigation said, “I 
can’t get into the mind of a psychopath.”19 Speaker of the House Paul Ryan 
pivoted immediately to a mental health cause: “[M]ental health reform is a 
critical ingredient to making sure we can try and prevent some of these 
things from happening.”20  
In the week after the shooting, investigators speculated that Paddock 
had a “severe mental illness” that was likely undiagnosed: “The portrait, 
gleaned from interviews with hundreds of people interviewed over the past 
week, is that while Paddock might have been financially successful, he had 
real difficulty interacting with people. He is described as standoffish, 
disconnected, a man who had difficulty establishing and maintaining 
 
18 See Batuman, supra note 1 (noting that “Paddock apparently exhibited . . . no symptoms 
of mental illness”). 
19 Bui et al., supra note 3. 
20 Rebecca Shabad, Paul Ryan Says Mental Health Reform Is “Critical Ingredient” in 
Stopping Mass Shootings, CBS NEWS (Oct. 3, 2017, 12:44 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com 
/news/paul-ryan-says-mental-health-reform-is-critical-ingredient-in-stopping-mass-shoot-
ings [https://perma.cc/3QVL-YSQD]. 
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meaningful relationships.”21 The article makes no mention of what “severe 
mental illness” has these symptoms. 
Even months later, after a scan of Paddock’s brain showed no 
abnormalities and no history of mental illness had emerged,22 a news story 
analyzing the investigation report of the shooting focused on Paddock’s 
mental health, noting that his primary care doctor—not a psychiatrist—
believed he had bipolar disorder and had prescribed him diazepam, a common 
anti-anxiety medication.23 The article even cites drugabuse.com in noting 
that diazepam can cause aggressive behaviors but provides no evidence 
either that the drug can provoke premeditated murders or that Paddock ever 
took the medication.24  
 
21 Pierre Thomas, Investigators Believe Las Vegas Gunman Had Severe Undiagnosed Mental 
Illness: Sources, ABC NEWS (Oct. 7, 2017, 6:32 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/ 
investigators-las-vegas-gunman-severe-undiagnosed-mental-illness/story?id=50346433 [https 
://perma.cc/7XHJ-3DQU]. 
22 See, e.g., Sheri Fink, Las Vegas Gunman’s Brain Exam Only Deepens Mystery of His 
Actions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/09/us/las-vegas-
attack-paddock-brain-autopsy.html [https://perma.cc/V7K6-NM6F] (“Stephen Paddock . . . 
had not had a stroke, brain tumor or a number of other neurological disorders that might have 
helped explain his actions . . . .”). Though Paddock’s brain scan showed some signs of 
abnormalities, experts remain unsure about their cause. Id.  
23 Colton Lochhead, Las Vegas Shooting Report Explores Gunman’s Mental Health, LAS 
VEGAS REV.-J. (Jan. 19, 2018, 8:13 PM), https://www.reviewjournal.com/crime/shootings 
/las-vegas-shooting-report-explores-gunmans-mental-health [https://perma.cc/5B3WDQJ2]. 
24 Id. Diazepam, the generic name for Valium, is one of the most prescribed drugs in the 
United States. See, e.g., ANDREA TONE, THE AGE OF ANXIETY: A HISTORY OF AMERICA’S 
TURBULENT AFFAIR WITH TRANQUILIZERS 153 (2008) (“Valium rapidly became a staple in 
medicine cabinets, as common as toothbrushes and razors.”); Arnie Cooper, An Anxious 
History of Valium, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 15, 2013, 7:30 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/an-
anxious-history-of-valium-1384547451 [https://perma.cc/J7D3-5YAS] (“Approved by the 
Food and Drug Administration in 1963, F. Hoffmann-La Roche’s drug, marketed to ‘reduce 
psychic tension,’ went on to become the Western world’s most widely prescribed answer to 
anxiety—and the first drug to reach $1 billion in sales.”). The side effect of “aggressive 
behaviors” is rare and studies have reached conflicting results on whether it even exists. 
Furthermore, the aggression observed during these studies was sudden fits of rage, not 
violent acts of meticulous planning. See Robert Kellner, Unwanted Effects of Minor 
Tranquilizers and Hypnotics, 5 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS, Nov. 1975, at 43, 44 (“The findings 
can be summed up as follows: In normal volunteers, chlordiazepoxide increases hostility; 
unexpected outbursts of rage have been reported in patients taking chlordiazepoxide and 
diazepam, but these are rare.”); Jari Tiihonen et al., Psychotropic Drugs And Homicide: A 
Prospective Cohort Study From Finland, 14 WORLD PSYCHIATRY 245, 246 (2015) (finding 
that “benzodiazepine and analgesic use was linked with a higher risk of homicidal offending, 
and the findings remained highly significant even after correction for multiple comparisons,” 
but noting that the study’s results likely could not be generalized “to countries with higher 
rates of organized and premeditated crime”). Chlordiazepoxide is an anti-anxiety medication 
similar to diazepam; both drugs are classified as benzodiazepines. See, e.g., Johns Hopkins 
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This kind of speculation about mental illness, even in the absence of 
any evidence, is rife after a mass shooting.25 The mere fact of the carnage 
supports a conclusion that the shooter was mentally ill. 26  Only 
“psychopaths”27 and the “deranged”28 would commit such a terrible act, 
we tell ourselves.29  
 
Psychiatry Guide: Benzodiazepines, JOHNS HOPKINS MED. (Dec. 19, 2016), https://www. 
hopkinsguides.com/hopkins/view/Johns_Hopkins_Psychiatry_Guide/787140/all/Benzodiaz
epines [https://perma.cc/EE7F-4VEH]. Even if diazepam were somehow linked to mass 
shootings, there is no evidence Paddock took the medication, only that he was prescribed it. 
25 See, e.g., Matthew E. Hirschtritt & Renee L. Binder, A Reassessment of Blaming Mass 
Shootings on Mental Illness, 75 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 311, 311 (2018) (describing the 
tendency of “policy makers, journalists, and the public” to link mental illness to mass 
shootings); Miranda Lynne Baumann & Brent Teasdale, Severe Mental Illness and Firearm 
Access: Is Violence Really the Danger?, 56 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 44, 48 (2018) (“In the 
wake of major gun violence events in the United States, popular discourse inevitably 
implicates firearm access among individuals with severe mental illness as a major 
contributing factor to the nation's gun violence epidemic. We found no support for this 
claim.” (citations omitted)). 
26 See David Tarrant, Despite Popular Belief, It’s Hard to Find a Direct Link Between Mental 
Illness and Mass Shootings Like Orlando’s, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Jun. 15, 2016, 1:40 
PM), https://www.dallasnews.com/news/2016/06/15/despite-popular-belief-its-hard-to-find 
-a-direct-link-between-mental-illness-and-mass-shootings-like-orlandos/ [https://perma.cc/ 
VJX2-N8NK] (“‘When you see shootings like those at Newtown, Conn., or Aurora, Colo., 
it’s hard to argue that mental illness didn’t play a role,’ [said Jonathan Metzl, a professor of 
sociology and psychiatry at Vanderbilt University]. But the shooter’s mental state is only 
one of several factors involved, he said.”). 
27 “Psychopath” is not a diagnosis in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, see generally 
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 
(5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5], but it is common shorthand for one who is mentally ill, 
see PHILIP T. YANOS, WRITTEN OFF: MENTAL HEALTH STIGMA AND THE LOSS OF HUMAN 
POTENTIAL 60-61 (2018) (noting that the New York Post used the terms “psycho,” “schizo,” 
and “madman” as synonymous with violence). 
28 See, e.g., Samantha Raphelson, What We Know About the Alleged Texas High School 
Shooter, NPR (May 19, 2018, 6:22 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018 
/05/19/612468377/what-we-know-about-dimitrios-pagourtzis-the-alleged-texas-high-school 
-shooter [https://perma.cc/LCG5-JZP3] (quoting one student who said Santa Fe High School 
shooter Dimitrios Pagourtzis “looks like a psychopath”); Andrew Restuccia, Trump: Texas 
Shooting Result of ‘Deranged Individual,’ ‘Isn’t a Guns Situation,’ POLITICO (Nov. 6, 2017, 
2:16 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/trump-texas-shooting-result-of-deranged-individual 
-isnt-a-guns-situation/?lo=ap_b1 [https://perma.cc/UZ53-HXME] (quoting Trump describ-
ing Sutherland Springs shooter Devin Kelley as “deranged”); Jacob Rodriguez & Heather 
Crawford, Community Still Mourns 1 Year After Pulse Nightclub Massacre, CBS19 (June 
12, 2017, 4:18 PM),  https://www.cbs19.tv/article/news/nation-now/orlando-shooting/ comm-
unity-still-mourns-1-year-after-pulse-nightclub-massacre/77-447434546 [https://perma.cc/ 5W3C-
WTHJ] (describing Pulse Nightclub shooter Omar Mateen as a “psychopath with a rifle”). 
29 See, e.g., NAT’L COUNCIL FOR BEHAVIORAL HEALTH, MASS VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: CAUSES, 
IMPACTS AND SOLUTIONS 5 (2019), https://www.thenationalcouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
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This simplistic explanation both is unsupported by the data, as I 
demonstrate in more detail in the following Section, and elides the 
complexities of mental illness. Mental illness, as conceived of and 
categorized in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, is as multifaceted a term 
as physical illness. It is comprised of a host of individual diagnoses, ranging 
from schizophrenia to eating disorders.30 There is no diagnosis for “mass 
shooter,” and even a violent act is not generally a symptom of a particular 
mental illness unless it is part of a pattern of such acts and accompanied by 
feelings of remorselessness and lack of empathy for others.31  
Blaming “mental illness” for mass shootings thus is nonsensical. It 
would be like blaming “physical illness” for death. Such a statement tells us 
nothing about the specific behaviors that could be predictors of violent 
behavior or the causal pathways that supposedly connect mental illness with 
violent acts. It serves only to make the perpetrator an “other,” to separate him 
from the rest of society, using the language of mental health.32 
This narrative has corrosive effects on the millions of individuals 
living with mental illness. Connecting mental illness and mass shootings 
hardens public attitudes against individuals with mental illness and further 
ingrains stigma in the public discourse and in the legal landscape. One study 
found that in the weeks following a shooting perpetrated by an individual 
with serious mental illness, news stories usually mentioned dangerous people 
as the cause of violence instead of dangerous weapons.33 This type of news 
coverage “may lead the public to view [serious mental illness] as an important 
cause of gun violence, when in reality other factors—such as criminals’ easy 
access to firearms—are more strongly associated with violent crime.”34 
The policy conversations held in the wake of these events also reinforce 
the connection between dangerous people and mass shootings. Proposed 
legislation to prevent mass shootings inevitably involves restrictions on the 
ability of people with mental health conditions to obtain firearms, regardless of 
whether the shooter actually suffered from a diagnosed serious mental illness.  
 
2019/08/Mass-Violence-in-America_8-6-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ZFU-S34W] (“Since it is 
difficult to imagine that a mentally healthy person would deliberately kill multiple strangers, it is 
commonly assumed that all perpetrators of mass violence must be mentally ill.”). 
30 DSM-5, supra note 27. 
31 Id. at 659-63 (defining antisocial personality disorder). 
32 See MICHAEL PERLIN, THE HIDDEN PREJUDICE: MENTAL DISABILITY ON TRIAL 36 (2000) 
(noting that associating mental illness and violence “allow[s] us to use the label of ‘sickness’ 
as reassurance that the other . . . is not like us”). 
33 See Emma E. McGinty et al., News Media Framing of Serious Mental Illness and Gun 
Violence in the United States, 1997–2012, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 406, 411 (2014) (finding 
“[a] higher proportion of news stories mentioned dangerous people with [serious mental 
illness] as opposed to dangerous weapons as the cause of gun violence”). 
34 Id. 
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For example, almost immediately after a shooter killed seventeen 
people at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida, gun 
safety advocates and legislators called for restrictions on the sale of firearms 
to people with mental health conditions as a way to prevent such shootings 
in the future.35 The law eventually incorporated a prohibition on the purchase 
or possession of firearms by one who has been “adjudicated mentally 
defective” or committed to a mental health facility.36 The shooter himself, 
who had never stayed in a mental health facility or appeared before a judge 
as a result of a mental health condition, would not have been prevented from 
buying a firearm under such restrictions.37  
As the news media and legislatures draw these links between mental 
illness and violence, the fear of individuals with mental illness grows 
stronger. For example, in one study, individuals who read a news story about 
a mass shooting committed by an individual with serious mental illness were 
more likely to believe that all people with serious mental health conditions 
were dangerous.38 Thus, every time a news report implicitly blames mental 
illness as the cause of a violent act, every time a legislature passes a law on 
mental health issues in a bill designed to address gun violence, the public sees 
its fear of individuals with mental illness as justified, and the association grows. 
 
35 See Susan Ferrechio, Paul Ryan: Congress Should Focus on Mental Health and Background 
Checks, Not Gun Ban, WASH. EXAMINER (Feb. 27, 2018), http://www.washingtonexaminer. 
com/paul-ryan-congress-should-focus-on-mental-health-and-background-checks-not-gun-ban/ 
article/2650142 [https://perma.cc/6CA2-YXVC] (quoting Paul Ryan calling for Congress to 
emphasize mental health and fix the background check system); Eric Levenson, These Are the 
Gun Bills Florida Lawmakers Are Debating After the Parkland Massacre, CNN (Feb. 28, 
2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/27/politics/fl-bills-guns-parkland-shooting/index.html [https: 
//perma.cc/V934-RQVR] (referencing efforts by Florida lawmakers to pass a mental health bill in 
the wake of the Parkland shooting). 
36 Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act, S. 7026, § 10, 2016 Sen., Reg. 
Sess. (Fl. 2018). 
37 See Phil McCausland, Florida Mental Health Agency Examined Cruz in 2016, Didn’t 
Hospitalize Him, NBC NEWS (Feb. 19, 2018, 7:51 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-
news/social-media-post-led-florida-agency-investigate-nikolas-cruz-2016-n849221 [https:// 
perma.cc/C9A3-ZLR9] (noting that Cruz had not been hospitalized, implicitly leaving him 
outside the scope of the relevant prohibition). 
38 See Emma E. McGinty et al., Effects of News Media Messages About Mass Shootings on 
Attitudes Toward Persons with Serious Mental Illness and Public Support for Gun Policies, 
170 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 494, 498-99 (2013) (concluding that depictions of violent people 
with mental illness in the news contributed to the public’s negative attitudes about all people 
living with serious mental health conditions); see also Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Mental 
Illness and Reduction of Gun Violence and Suicide: Bringing Epidemiologic Research to 
Policy, 25 ANNALS EPIDEMIOLOGY 366, 367 (2015) (“The public perception of a strong link 
between mental illness and violence is fueled in part by news coverage of mass shootings 
and other violent events.”). 
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B. The Facts 
 
Yet the myth that those who suffer from mental illnesses are dangerous 
is not supported by the data. When we look to mass shootings, some weak links 
do appear connecting individuals suffering from symptoms of mental illness 
and these tragic events. But there is not a direct line between mental illness and 
mass shootings; the correlation has varied significantly across studies, even 
disappearing altogether in some analyses. Moreover, even when the correlation 
exists, mental illness may not be the main driver of mass shooting events. Other 
correlates—especially feelings of resentment and entitlement—are more 
closely associated with random public violence.  
When we broaden our scope to look not just at the rare mass shooting 
event but at the much larger problem of gun violence overall, the links between 
mental illness and violence disappear almost entirely. Better predictors of gun 
violence are past violent acts or substance abuse. 
 
1. Mass Shootings39 
 
The link between mass shootings and mental illness is far more modest 
than the conversations in the wake of a mass shooting would suggest, appearing 
in some studies, disappearing in others, and never conclusively pinpointing 
mental illness as a cause. One review of the literature noted, “Psychiatric illness, 
although present in some mass murderers and mass shooters, is far from the 
most significant or consistent finding from attempts to investigate the nature of 
these deeply troubling events.”40 
In the following pages, I tease out the themes from these studies, 
beginning with those that show no links between mental illness and mass 
shootings before moving on to those where some connections appeared. 
 
39 Definitions of the term “mass shooting” vary widely, but since my focus is on the events 
that garner media coverage and drive the conversation on gun policy, I will adopt the 
definition used by Mother Jones in its mass-shootings compilation, which is designed to 
focus on public mass murders, rather than all murders with a high body count: “four or more 
victims killed in an indiscriminate public rampage.” Mark Follman et al., A Guide to Mass 
Shootings in America, MOTHER JONES (Aug. 31, 2019), https://www.motherjones.com/ 
politics/2012/07/mass-shootings-map/ [https://perma.cc/R7JZ-JEK5]; see also Mark Follman, 
No, There Has Not Been a Mass Shooting Every Day This Year, MOTHER JONES (Dec. 18, 
2015), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/12/no-there-were-not-355-mass-shootings 
-this-year/ [https://perma.cc/46XR-DXGS]. 
40 James L. Knoll & George D. Annas, Mass Shootings and Mental Illness, in GUN VIOLENCE 
AND MENTAL ILLNESS 83 (2016). 
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We begin with a recent FBI study of active shooter41 incidents.42 Of 
the sixty-three active shooters sampled, only three had been diagnosed with 
a psychotic disorder at the time of the study.43 A greater spectrum of these 
shooters, twenty-five percent, had been diagnosed with a mental illness of 
some kind. 44  Aside from the three shooters who were diagnosed with a 
psychotic disorder, twelve active shooters had been diagnosed with a mood 
disorder, such as depression, four had been diagnosed with an anxiety 
disorder, and two had been diagnosed with personality disorders.45  
These mental illnesses have little in common symptomatically. A 
psychotic disorder involves a problem with cognition or thinking; the 
individual hears things that are not there or believes things that are not true.46 
Individuals suffering from mood or anxiety disorders have elevated 
emotional states; their emotions interfere with their daily lives.47 And an 
individual with a personality disorder has an “enduring pattern of inner 
experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of the 
individual’s culture,” which cannot be explained through a diagnosis of 
another type of mental illness.48  
Because these mental disorders manifest so differently, it is difficult 
to conclude that “mental illness” is the driver of active shootings. The 
 
41 These researchers defined an “active shooter” as one engaged in killing or attempting to 
kill people in a populated area and identified 160 such incidents from between 2000 and 
2013. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, A STUDY OF ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES BETWEEN 2000 AND 2013, at 5 (2013). While there is some overlap between 
these events and the Mother Jones “mass shooter” definition, the two are not entirely 
coextensive because the FBI counts events with fewer victims as “active shooter” incidents. 
Id. From their original list, the FBI culled the sixty-three shooters: (1) for whom there was 
an adequate law enforcement record to determine motivations and pre-attack behaviors, and 
(2) who planned their attacks in advance.  FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, A STUDY OF THE 
PRE-ATTACK BEHAVIORS OF ACTIVE SHOOTERS 8 (2018). 
42 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, A STUDY OF THE PRE-ATTACK BEHAVIORS OF ACTIVE 
SHOOTERS, supra note 41, at 26. 
43 Id. at 17. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. While these numbers add up to more than twenty-five percent, some of the perpetrators 
had co-occurring mental health conditions, meaning that one person had been diagnosed with 
more than one mental illness. Id. 
46 The hallmark of psychotic disorders like schizophrenia is a symptom of malfunctioning thinking, 
such as delusions, hallucinations, or disorganized speech. DSM-5, supra note 27, at 87-88. 
47 To be diagnosed with major depression, for example, individuals must experience at least 
five symptoms every day for a two-week period or more; symptoms include frequent 
thoughts of death, significant unintentional weight gain or loss, fatigue, insomnia, inability 
to concentrate, diminished pleasure in most activities, and feelings of worthlessness or guilt. 
DSM-5, supra note 27, at 160-61. 
48  DSM-5, supra note 27, at 645. An individual diagnosed with antisocial personality 
disorder, for example, exhibits a pervasive pattern of “disregard for, and violation of, the 
rights of others.” DSM-5, supra note 27, at 659. 
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psychotic symptoms experienced by the person living with schizophrenia are 
not necessarily shared by those with mood or personality disorders.49 If one 
with schizophrenia shoots because he is hallucinating, then that cause fails to 
explain why a person with depression shoots or why an individual with 
antisocial personality disorder shoots.50  
Moreover, while the fact that twenty-five percent of shooters suffered 
from a diagnosed mental illness may seem to indicate a high correlation 
between such afflictions and active shooters, about the same number of active 
shooters (twenty-four percent) had a military background.51 A much higher 
percentage were male (ninety-four percent) and white (sixty-three percent).52  
The FBI has therefore concluded that a diagnosis of mental illness did 
not have much predictive value in attempting to determine who will become 
an active shooter.53 As the researchers wrote in their report, “[F]ormally 
diagnosed mental illness is not a very specific predictor of violence of any 
type, let alone targeted violence.”54  
One study of a different set of individuals, thirty-four adolescents who 
committed mass murders between 1958 and 1999, produced results that mirrored 
the patterns found by the FBI.55 Researchers found that a similar proportion, 
twenty-three percent of the murderers, had a psychiatric treatment history,56 and 
 
49 That said, individuals can experience symptoms of multiple mental illnesses at once. For 
example, about twenty-five percent of individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia also meet 
the criteria for depression. See Samuel G. Siris, Depression in Schizophrenia: Perspective in 
the Era of “Atypical” Antipsychotic Agents, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1379, 1380 (2000). But 
simply because this is true does not negate the problem of causal pathways. We still do not 
know whether it was the psychotic symptoms of schizophrenia, or the emotional symptoms 
of depression, or neither, or both in tandem, that caused the given violent act. 
50 See Knoll & Annas, supra note 40, at 90 (“The likelihood of error and oversimplification 
is substantial when mental illness is considered on ‘the aggregate level’ such that a ‘vast and 
diverse population of persons diagnosed with psychiatric conditions’ is considered to 
uniformly represent people who are at risk of committing gun violence against others.” 
(citing Jonathan M. Metzl & Kenneth T. Macleish, Mental Illness, Mass Shootings, and the 
Policies of American Fire-Arms, 105 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 240 (2015))); cf. Vars, supra note 
12, at 1639-42 (arguing that specific symptoms, especially psychotic symptoms, were more 
closely aligned with violence than a diagnosis of mental illness; “it appears that not every 
diagnosis carries an increased risk of violence”). 
51 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, A STUDY OF THE PRE-ATTACK BEHAVIORS OF ACTIVE 
SHOOTERS, supra note 41, at 11. 
52 Id. at 10. 
53 Id. at 17. 
54 Id. 
55 John Reid Meloy et al., A Comparative Analysis of North American Adolescent and Adult 
Mass Murderers, 22 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 291 (2004). 
56 Id. at 297. 
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only two of the perpetrators were psychotic at the time of the murders.57  
But some analyses have looked beyond diagnosed mental illness to 
symptoms of mental illness—diagnosed or not—and here the picture 
becomes somewhat more complicated. For example, a Mother Jones 
examination of mass shootings furthers the narrative of mass shootings as an 
outgrowth of a mental health condition.58 Of 110 mass shootings counted as 
of the writing of this Article, the perpetrators of fifty-nine, just over half, had 
“prior signs of mental health issues.”59 
But a look at what, specifically, these signs of a mental health 
condition were raises more questions than it answers. Some of the entries 
classified individuals as showing signs of a mental health condition based on 
vague statements from third parties. For example, a cousin said Douglas 
Williams, who killed six people at his Lockheed Martin workplace before 
committing suicide, “was depressed and ‘going through a lot of things.’”60 
Neighbors said Terry Michael Ratzmann, who killed six people at his church, 
“suffered from depression and had a drinking problem.”61 
In other entries in the database, past violent acts qualified as a sign of 
a mental health condition. Devin Kelley, who shot twenty-six people at a 
church in Sutherland Springs, Texas, “had a history of domestic violence.”62 
Jimmy Lam, who shot three of his coworkers, had “a history of domestic, 
work conflicts.”63 These past violent acts are not necessarily a sign of a 
mental health condition; classifying them as such is a sign that the authors 
were not particularly careful in who they placed in the mental health 
condition box. 
A different study honed in on psychotic symptoms and did find some 
links between that type of mental illness and mass violence.64 Researchers 
assessed thirty adult mass murderers65 and found that sixty-seven percent 
were either diagnosed with a psychotic disorder or exhibited behaviors 
 
57  Id.; see also Lisa Aitken et al., Mass Murders: Implications for Mental Health 
Professionals, 38 INT’L J. PSYCHIATRY MED. 261, 264 (2008) (noting that only six percent 
of adolescent mass murderers showed signs of psychosis). 
58 Follman et al., A Guide to Mass Shootings in America, supra note 39. 
59 Id. (click on “open-source database documenting mass shootings” to view data). 
60 Id.  
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Meloy et al., supra note 55, at 303-04. 
65 Researchers limited their sample to single adults who intentionally killed three victims 
other than themselves in a single incident, using a firearm as a weapon. Id. They excluded 
multiple murders that fit into another category of homicide, i.e., serial, spree, felony related, 
gang motivated, or politically motivated. Id. at 295; see also Anthony Hempel et al., Offender 
and Offense Characteristics of a Nonrandom Sample of Mass Murderers, 27 J. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY & L. 213, 214 (1999) (employing the same definition). 
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associated with psychosis.66  
To be sure, there is a subset of the ranks of mass shooters who do 
exhibit psychotic symptoms. Jared Loughner, who murdered six people in a 
parking lot during a meet-and-greet with Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords, 
had displayed psychotic symptoms before the shooting. 67  He talked to 
himself, laughed inappropriately, and was paranoid about the government 
following him.68 James Holmes visited a campus psychiatrist before shooting 
twelve people in a movie theater in Aurora, Colorado.69 At their last meeting, 
he made homicidal and paranoid statements; the psychiatrist was concerned 
that he was sliding into schizophrenia.70  
The wild swings in percentages of individuals who have diagnosable 
mental disorders, especially those with psychotic symptoms, may be a 
function of the small sample sizes when dealing with mass shootings. These 
are such rare events that small changes in the composition of the sample can 
lead to massive fluctuations in results.71  
But even accepting the most damning view of these statistics, that 
two-thirds of mass shooters harbor psychotic symptoms, 72  the question 
remains whether it is the psychosis that drives the actions or some other 
factor. All of these studies are retrospective, nonrandom, and small. They 
draw only from the pool of mass shooters and do not have a comparison 
group.73  As one researcher cautioned, these shortcomings mean that the 
 
66 Meloy et al., supra note 55, at 305. 
67  See Sarah Gassen & Timothy Williams, Before Attack, Parents of Gunman Tried to 
Address Son’s Strange Behavior, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2013), https://www.nytimes 
.com/2013/03/28/us/documents-2011-tucson-shooting-case-gabrielle-giffords.html [https:// 
perma.cc/WF3W-WNQE].  
68 See Cindy Carcamo & Michelle Mello, Reports Detail Jared Loughner’s Behavior Before 
Tucson Shooting, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2013), https://www.latimes.com/nation/la-xpm-
2013-mar-27-la-na-ff-jared-loughner-20130328-story.html [https://perma.cc/PAH5-8DGP] 
(“In an interview with law enforcement officials, Loughner’s mother, Amy Loughner, said 
her son had been acting strangely for about a year, often talking or laughing to himself, and 
was angry with the government, though she did not say why.”); Benedict Cary, Red Flags at 
a College, but Tied Hands, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2011/01/11/us/11mental.html [https://perma.cc/NCL5-CT8J] (“Sometimes surly, sometimes 
seemingly unhinged, [Loughner] was unpredictable in a way that made fellow students in a 
community college class want to leave the room.”). 
69 Matthew Nussbaum et al., Aurora Theater Shooting Gunman Told Doctor: “You Can’t Kill 
Everyone,” DENV. POST (Jun. 16, 2015), https://www.denverpost.com/2015/06/16/aurora-
theater-shooting-gunman-told-doctor-you-cant-kill-everyone/ [https://perma.cc/Z58Z-9CES]. 
70 Id. 
71 See Paul Appelbaum, Public Safety, Mental Disorders, and Guns, 70 JAMA PSYCHIATRY 
565, 565 (2013). 
72 Meloy et al., supra note 55, at 303-05. 
73 The problem with this approach is that the researchers select the study group based solely 
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studies have no predictive value; their findings cannot be generalized to 
disrupt future mass shootings.74  
Thus, while psychosis may be correlated with mass shootings (and 
even the correlation has not been definitively proven),75 it may not be the 
cause of mass shootings.76 Jared Loughner, for example, was known to use 
drugs around the time of the Tucson shooting;77 drug and alcohol abuse are 
more highly correlated with violence than mental illness and could be the 
driver behind the act.78  
Researchers have also found that one common thread linking most 
mass murderers was extreme anger paired with a feeling that others were 
treating the shooter unfairly.79 Shooters felt as if they were entitled to kill 
others because of the wrongs that had been done to them.80 These threads 
were present regardless of whether the individual had symptoms of 
psychosis or other mental illness.81 As one expert on mass shootings noted 
 
on the dependent variable and do not compare that group to any other group, which means 
no causal links can be drawn. They do not look to the entirety of the U.S. population to see 
who turns out to be a mass shooter; they look only to mass shooters to see what characteristics 
they possess. As a perhaps helpful analogy that illustrates the problems with this approach, 
a study group comprised only of dead people would show that going to the hospital is a 
mortality risk. See, e.g., DONALD T. CAMPBELL & JULIAN C. STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND 
QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH 6-7 (1963) (describing this type of study as 
having “such a total absence of control as to be of almost no scientific value”). 
74 Hempel et al., supra note 65, at 224. 
75 See, e.g., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, supra note 41, at 7, 17 (finding that only three 
out of sixty-three active shooters (or just under five percent) had been diagnosed with a 
psychotic disorder). 
76 Cf. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 173 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (“Correlation is not causation.”). 
77 A.G. Sulzberger & Jennifer Medina, Shooting Suspect Had Been Known to Use Potent, 
and Legal, Hallucinogen, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2011, at A16. 
78 See infra Section I.B.2. 
79 See Knoll & Annas, supra note 40, at 84 (“Factors common among individuals who 
commit mass murder include extreme feelings of anger and revenge, the lack of an 
accomplice (when the perpetrator is an adult), feelings of social alienation, and planning well 
in advance of the offense.”). 
80 As stated in A Comparative Analysis of North American Adolescent and Adult Mass 
Murderers,  
Ubiquitous throughout our data for both the adolescents and the adults is 
a pathologically narcissistic belief that they had a right to kill others, a 
sense of entitlement that may have been exacerbated by the porcupine 
quills of paranoia or the suffocating blanket of depression. Such feelings 
and attitudes, however, still need to be hardened by a shell of callousness 
to be acted upon. 
Meloy et al., supra note 55, at 304. 
81 Id.; see also James Fox & Monica DeLateur, Mass Shootings in America: Moving Beyond 
Newtown, 18 HOMICIDE STUD. 125, 133 (2013) (finding that mass shooters tend to share 
 
 Journal of Law & Public Affairs [Jan. 2020 
 
   
 
18  
after the Parkland murders, “Most of these shooters are angry, antisocial 
individuals you cannot spot in advance.”82  
The truth is, these events are so rare that we simply do not know, and 
likely will never know, their root cause. 83  Yet mass shooters are often 
characterized as mentally ill, regardless of their actual mental health status. 
This finger-pointing occurs despite the fact that certain traits, such as extreme 
anger hardened by resentment and entitlement, are stronger predictors of who 
will turn publicly, randomly violent than a mental illness diagnosis alone. 
 
2. Other Types of Gun Violence 
 
While mass shootings and other sensational events tend to drive gun 
policy,84 they remain extraordinarily rare events.85 Gun murders due to angry 
altercations, domestic violence, and other criminal activity, like robberies or 
drugs, are far more common.86 On average, almost thirty-three people are 
murdered with a gun every day in the United States.87 Let’s look at May 19, 
2019, the day before I wrote this paragraph, as an example. Early that 
morning, police found Dorian Brooks dead from a gunshot wound on a city 
street in Savannah, Georgia.88 At around 6 A.M., in Muskegon Heights, 
Michigan, a husband returned to his home and shot his wife four times, killing 
 
some behavioral characteristics, such as resentment, social isolation, and the tendency to 
externalize blame). 
82 Benedict Carey, Opening Mental Hospitals Unlikely to Prevent Mass Shootings, Experts 
Say, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/22/health/trump-
mental-hospitals-parkland.html [https://perma.cc/NCL5-CT8J]. 
83 See Jeffrey W. Swanson, Explaining Rare Acts of Violence: The Limits of Evidence from 
Population Research, 62 PSYCHIATRIC SERV. 1369, 1369 (2011) (explaining that “we do not 
possess the data” to conduct epidemiological studies into the causes of mass shootings). 
84 See, e.g., Swanson et al., supra note 38, at 366 (describing the Newtown shooting as 
opening “a rare public window of opportunity to enact meaningful reforms to reduce gun 
violence in America”). 
85 Swanson, supra note 83, at 1369. 
86  See, e.g., DEBRA L. KARCH ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
SURVEILLANCE FOR VIOLENT DEATHS, NATIONAL VIOLENT DEATH REPORTING SYSTEM, 16 
STATES, 2007, at 10 (finding that, for cases where causes were known, about thirty-three 
percent of homicides were precipitated by another crime like robbery, assault, or drug-related 
incidents). 
87 Eugenio Weigend Vargas, Gun Violence in America: A State-by-State Analysis, CTR. FOR 
AM. PROGRESS (2019), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/guns-crime/news/2019/11 
/20/477218/gun-violence-america-state-state-analysis/ [https://perma.cc/64GL-26AA]. 
88 Police Investigate After Gunshot Victim Found in Downtown Savannah, WTOC (May 19, 
2019), https://www.wtoc.com/2019/05/19/savannah-police-investigate-after-gunshot-victim 
-found-downtown-savannah/ [https://perma.cc/TP4D-AHFT]. 
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her, after they had argued and he had moved out.89 Later that day, at a college 
graduation party in Arlington, Texas, a man shot and killed a sixty-three-
year-old fellow partygoer after they got into a fight.90 These acts are not the 
rare-but-sensational mass murder but the run-of-the-mill killings so common 
that they are no more than blips on the local news. 
When we examine this kind of gun violence, the uncertain links with 
mental illness dissipate further. Studies in the last three decades have shown 
that the assumed link between mental illness and violent acts is attenuated at 
best, and that other factors, such as substance abuse, are more highly 
correlated with violence.91  
The MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study, which analyzed 
links between violence and mental illness, followed 1,136 individuals for one 
year after their discharge from a psychiatric hospital and compared them to 
519 people who lived in the same neighborhoods.92 Researchers found that 
individuals with mental illness and no substance abuse disorder were no more 
likely to be violent than their neighbors.93 
This data set is the only study that compared a population with mental 
illness to their neighbors, thus controlling for environmental effects that may 
increase violence.94 Because these individuals resided in the same places, 
usually neighborhoods with high levels of poverty, the rates of violence were 
somewhat elevated above national norms.95  
 
89 Suspect in Custody Following Fatal Muskegon Heights Shooting, WZZM13 (May 19, 2019), 
https://www.wzzm13.com/article/news/suspect-in-custody-following-fatal-muskegon-heights-
shooting/69-c13ce65e-5e32-4be9-a6b1-7a96f7e16ebb [https://perma.cc/8D2U-Z7W9].  
90 Jake Harris, 1 Dead After Shooting at College Grad Party in Arlington, Police Say, 
WFAA8 (May 19, 2019), https://www.wfaa.com/article/news/local/1-dead-after-shooting-
at-college-grad-party-in-arlington-police-say/287-64ec5596-d9f8-4c86-addb-6b00d3511033 
[https://perma.cc/Q2TQ-PQDF].  
91 See, e.g., Henry J. Steadman et al., Violence by People Discharged from Acute Psychiatric 
Inpatient Facilities and by Others in the Same Neighborhoods, 55 ARCHIVES GEN. 
PSYCHIATRY 393, 400 (1998) (stating that results from one study site showed that rates of 
violence were the same among individuals with mental disorders and those without when 
neither group abused substances: “Substance abuse significantly raised the prevalence of 
violence in both patient and community samples”). 
92 Id. at 394-95. 
93 Id. at 400. The study also found that individuals with both a mental illness and a substance 
abuse disorder were more likely to be violent than their substance-abusing neighbors, and that 
individuals with mental illness were more likely to abuse substances than their neighbors. Id. 
94 See Emma E. McGinty & Daniel W. Webster, Gun Violence and Serious Mental Illness, 
in GUN VIOLENCE AND MENTAL ILLNESS 8 (Liza H. Gold & Robert I. Simon eds., 2016) 
(“One interpretation of the MacArthur study’s findings is that these socioeconomic and 
environmental influences on violence are stronger than the effects of mental illness on 
violence, in effect overpowering the relationship between serious mental illness and violence 
observed in the ECA study.”). 
95 Steadman et al., supra note 91, at 401. 
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Researchers looked at the study population in ten-week increments 
over the course of a year. In any given ten-week period, somewhere between 
4% and 5.7% of the sample population that did not also have substance abuse 
symptoms committed an act of violence.96 The community group reported a 
3.3% rate of violence for a ten-week period, a difference that was not 
statistically significant.97 
The story shifted when substance abuse symptoms were taken into 
account. For the sample population, the highest rates of violence were seen 
in the initial ten-week period after release from the hospital, where twenty-
two percent of substance-abusing former patients committed an act of 
violence.98 In the least-violent ten-week period, 6.1% of the same group acted 
violently. 99  But the community sample of individuals who exhibited 
substance abuse symptoms also acted more violently than the community 
group without such symptoms, with 11.1% committing a violent act in the 
ten weeks before the researcher interview.100 The researchers concluded that 
there was a statistically significant difference between the study sample and 
the neighborhood sample in the rates of violence among the groups abusing 
drugs or alcohol in the first ten-week period after release, but not for any of 
the other time periods.101 
Thus, without substance abuse symptoms, psychiatric patients were 
no more likely to be violent than their neighbors. With substance abuse 
symptoms, violence rates skyrocketed both among both psychiatric patients 
and their neighbors. The authors concluded that “discharged mental patients” 
were not a homogeneous population and rates of violence varied considerably 
between those who abused substances and those who did not.102 
Later analysis of the group of patients who acted violently found that 
most of these acts did not involve use of a gun, and that those individuals who 
did use a gun were much more likely to have prior arrests or substance abuse 
problems than the rest of the discharged patient study group.103 Only two 
percent of the former patients used a gun in a violent act.104 Of that small 
group, only two of the patients had not been previously arrested, an arrest rate 
 
96  Id. at 399 tbl.5. The researchers defined “violence” to mean an act causing injury, 
including both use of weapons and the threat of using a weapon. Id. at 395. 
97 Id. at 399 tbl.5. 
98 Id. at 399. 
99 Id.  
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 393. 
103 Henry J. Steadman et al., Gun Violence and Victimization of Strangers by Persons with a 
Mental Illness: Data from the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study, 66 PSYCHIATRIC 
SERV. 1238, 1239-40 (2015). 
104 Id. at 1239. 
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twice as high as the overall patient sample.105 Almost all of the discharged 
patients who committed gun violence had been admitted to the hospital 
with either an alcohol (seventy-four percent) or drug abuse (fifty-two 
percent) diagnosis; these rates are again over twice as high as the overall 
discharged patient group.106  
Other studies using the MacArthur data set examined whether certain 
characteristics among the study population raised the risk of violent acts: one 
analyzed access to firearms and another looked at specific mental health 
symptoms.107 In the first study, researchers found that while having access to a 
firearm increased the risk of violence both among former patients and among 
community members, the former patients with firearms access were no more 
likely to use those guns violently than others in the community with the same 
access.108 But while patient status had no effect on rates of violence, drug abuse 
was highly correlated with an increased risk.109 The authors concluded that gun 
violence among those with mental illness is extraordinarily rare outside of the 
risk factors that predict violence among the general population.110 
The second study analyzed whether delusions were positively 
associated with violent acts.111 It found that people in the study group who 
lived with delusions were no more likely to be violent than nondelusional 
people.112 With some types of delusions—such as a belief that your body or 
mind was being controlled by someone else—the rates of violence were 
actually lower than for nondelusional subjects.113 The study instead found 
that, for both delusional and nondelusional subjects, imagined violence—
thinking about hurting other people—was associated with an uptick in actual 
violence.114 
This research debunks many assumptions about links between mental 
illness and violence: that delusional thoughts prompt violent behavior, that 
individuals with mental illness would use weapons violently if given access 
to them, and that individuals with mental illness are more violent than others 
in the same neighborhoods. The MacArthur studies raise serious questions as 
to whether any of these things are true. 
 
105 Id. at 1239-40. 
106 Id.  
107 Paul S. Appelbaum et al., Violence and Delusions: Data from the MacArthur Violence 
Risk Assessment Study, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 566, 568 (2000); Baumann & Teasdale, 
supra note 25, at 46. 
108 Baumann & Teasdale, supra note 25, at 48. 
109 Id. at 47-48. 
110 Id. at 48. 
111 Appelbaum et al., supra note 107, at 566.  
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 568. 
114 Id. at 569. 
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Earlier studies using different methodologies did find more of a link 
between mental illness and violence, confusing the picture somewhat.115 The 
differences between these results and the MacArthur results could be entirely 
accounted for by differences in methodology, such as the different definitions 
of violence or different methods of populating the subject groups.116 But even 
putting aside these differences, pre-MacArthur studies showed mental illness 
was only weakly correlated with violence and was not the driver of the vast 
majority of violence in the United States. 
In one of the largest of these studies, the Epidemiologic Catchment 
Area (ECA) study, researchers assessed the prevalence of mental disorders 
and violence among residents of three American cities. 117  Unlike the 
MacArthur study, the researchers did not rely solely on individuals who had 
previously been hospitalized; they assessed symptoms of mental illness 
among the over 18,000 respondents, drawn mainly from community 
households but also from prisons, nursing homes, and psychiatric facilities.118 
They did not compare these populations to others in the same neighborhoods, 
but to those living in the sampled metropolitan areas.119 
Researchers found a weak but statistically significant link between some 
serious mental illnesses and violence. For example, around seven percent of 
individuals suffering from schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or major depression 
had committed a violent act in the past year, as compared to two percent of 
individuals without a mental illness or substance abuse disorder.120  
As with the MacArthur study, abuse of substances led to a dramatic rise 
in violent behavior. Over twenty-one percent of individuals with a substance 
abuse disorder had committed an act of violence in the previous year.121  
A few caveats to this finding that are relevant to the purposes of this 
Article: First, the data did not differentiate between the severity of different 
violent acts. A person who threw a plate at his wife or was in a physical 
 
115 See generally McGinty & Webster, supra note 94, at 6-9 (surveying studies of “the 
prevalence of violence among the population with mental illness”). 
116 See Appelbaum et al., supra note 107, at 570-71. One example of the differences in 
methodology: past studies had shown a small but significant relationship between delusions 
and violence. These researchers had assessed delusional symptoms based on screening 
questions; interviewers in the MacArthur study were instructed to probe further and assess 
whether the subject was actually experiencing delusions, resulting in a smaller pool of 
subjects classified as delusional. Id. 
117  Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Violence and Psychiatric Disorder in the Community: 
Evidence from the Epidemiologic Catchment Area Surveys, 41 HOSP. & COMMUNITY 
PSYCHIATRY 761, 762 (1990). 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 769. 
121 Id. at 766. 
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fight while drinking without landing a punch was counted as “violent,” the 
same as a subject who committed multiple murders.122 The statistic does not 
mean that seven percent of individuals with serious mental illness shot or 
even physically harmed another person. 
Second, researchers also found that youth, male gender, and low 
socioeconomic status all were linked to violent acts.123  These factors were 
correlated with higher rates of violence, regardless of whether the individual 
was mentally ill. 124  Later studies supported the hypothesis that social and 
economic factors, such as poverty, crime victimization, involvement with drugs 
and drug markets, early life trauma, and neighborhood crime, may largely 
account for the small links found between mental illness and violence.125 
Regardless, given the small portion of the population that suffers from 
serious mental illness, researchers estimated that only four percent of violent 
crime in the United States was driven by mental illness alone.126 Or, put another 
way, even if the government could somehow detain every person whose violent 
acts were caused by mental illness before they acted, ninety-six percent of 
violent acts would still occur.127 And this number included all violent acts, not 
only violent acts with a gun. The narrative that the gun violence problem is 
mainly a mental illness problem is not supported by these results.128 
Given the weak, at best, links between mental illness and violence, a 
diagnosis of mental illness tells us little about a person’s capacity to pick up 
a gun and shoot another. Moreover, the relatively small number of people 
who have a serious mental illness—at least as compared with individuals with 
alcohol or drug abuse problems—means that even if there was some 
predisposition to violence, they pose a relatively small risk overall.129 But, as 
illustrated below, mental illness gun bans do little to capture the tiny subset 
of individuals with mental illness who do pose a risk, and other factors, like 
substance abuse or violent history, would better identify “dangerous” 
individuals among this group.  
 
 
122 Id. at 763. 
123 Id. at 764. 
124 Id. at 769. 
125 Swanson et al., supra note 38, at 368-69. 
126 Id. at 368. 
127 Swanson et al., supra note 38, at 368; see also John S. Rozel & Edward P. Mulvey, The 
Link Between Mental Illness and Firearm Violence: Implications for Social Policy and 
Clinical Practice, 13 ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 445, 448 (2017) (“[E]ven if all of the 
association between mental illness and violence could somehow be eliminated, we would 
still have to confront 96% of the violence in the United States.”). 
128 See Baumann & Teasdale, supra note 25, at 44 (“[T]here is little evidence to suggest that 
mental illness contributes to >3–5% of all violent crime, and there is even less evidence to 
suggest that mental illness is a primary cause of gun-involved crime, including homicide.”). 
129 Swanson et al., supra note 117, at 769. 
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II. THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
 
The folly in mental illness gun bans is the assumption that keeping 
guns out of the hands of individuals with mental illness who have come to 
the attention of courts or medical professionals will meaningfully reduce gun 
violence. It assumes we can point to those who have been found incompetent 
or involuntarily committed to psychiatric hospitals and say, “Them. They are 
the problem. The rest of us can be trusted with our guns.”  
But the psychiatric literature provides little to no support for these 
assumptions. These laws therefore fail at their goal of preventing guns from 
getting into the hands of dangerous people because they define the prohibited 
group in ways that both include many individuals who will never be violent 
and exclude many individuals who pose a risk. 
 
A. Federal Law 
 
The federal mental illness gun ban has two pathways to prohibition. 
First, one can be adjudicated “a mental defective.”130 I will set aside for the 
moment the offensiveness of the term “mental defective”131 to focus on the 
substance of these restrictions. Second, one can be committed to a mental 
institution.132 
 
     1.  Adjudicated as Mental Defective 
 
Under federal law, one is “adjudicated as a mental defective” when a 
court has found either that he “lacks the mental capacity to contract or manage 
his own affairs” or “is a danger to himself or others.”133 It includes “a finding 
of insanity by a court in a criminal case” and those “found incompetent to 
stand trial or found not guilty by reason of lack of mental responsibility” 
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.134  
 
130 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2018) (“It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been 
adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to a mental institution . . . to 
possess . . . any firearm.”). 
131 See generally Seen as Offensive, “Defective” Label for the Mentally Ill Lives on in the Federal 
Code, FEDLINE (Jan. 5, 2014), http://fedline.federaltimes.com/2014/01/05/seen-as-outdated-and-
offensive-label-for-the-mentally-ill-lives-on-in-the-federal-code/ [https://perma.cc/7MQB-M2ZV] 
(noting the continued existence of the term “defective” in the United States Code despite its 
offensive nature). Contrast this approach with the Supreme Court’s refusal to continue using 
the term “mental retardation.” See Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701, 704 (2014) (using the term 
“intellectual disability” instead of the term “mental retardation”). 
132 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(4) (2018). 
133 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2019). 
134 Id. 
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The first barrier to entry here is “adjudicated.” To fit within this 
definition, individuals must have come into contact with a court system or 
other adjudicative body in some way.135 This requirement excludes the vast 
majority of individuals who go on to commit mass shootings, many of whom 
had no contact with the mental health or judicial systems before their 
attack.136 Both James Holmes and Jared Loughner showed clear symptoms of 
mental illness before their shootings, but had not been adjudicated as such.137 
Just as problematically, the individuals the statute does capture are 
often not the ones most likely to act violently. To be adjudicated incompetent 
to stand trial, for example, one must be unable to understand the proceedings 
or communicate with her attorney.138 Not every defendant who suffers from 
mental illness will meet these criteria.139 In fact, only a small proportion of 
defendants who show signs of mental illness are found incompetent each year.140  
And there is no inherent relationship between incompetence and 
dangerousness. To be incompetent usually means to be seriously mentally ill, 
and, as demonstrated above, serious mental illness is not associated with 
violence in any meaningful way.141 
 
135 See Franklin v. Sessions, 291 F. Supp. 3d 705, 714-15 (W.D. Pa. 2017) (noting that the 
“plain meaning of ‘adjudicated’ connotes the involvement of a judicial decision-maker, the 
resolution of a dispute after consideration of argument by the parties involved, and a 
deliberative proceeding with some form of due process”). 
136 See Vars, supra note 12, at 1639 (“The most fundamental shortcoming of diagnosis and 
treatment-based restrictions is that they require a diagnosis or treatment. Millions of people 
with mental illness are not diagnosed and do not receive treatment.”). 
137  See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text (describing how both Holmes and 
Loughner showed signs of mental illness prior to their shootings). 
138 See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (“[T]he test must be whether he 
has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational 
understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the 
proceedings against him.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
139 See, e.g., Anne Bowen Poulin, Strengthening the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Counsel, 
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1213, 1218 (2006) (characterizing the competence standard as a “low 
baseline, focusing on the bare essentials of the defendant’s involvement at trial”). 
140 See, e.g., Susan McMahon, Reforming Competence Restoration Statutes: An Outpatient 
Model, 107 GEO. L.J. 601, 607 (2019) (stating that 10,000–12,000 defendants are found 
incompetent annually, while 50,000–60,000 defendants are referred for competency 
assessments annually (citing CURT R. BARTOL & ANNE M. BARTOL, PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: 
RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 105 (2015))). 
141 See Lauren Kois et al., Competency to Stand Trial Among Female Inpatients, 37 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 231, 232, 235 (2012) (noting that “defendants with a psychotic disorder, 
relative to a nonpsychotic disorder, were eight times more likely to be opined incompetent” 
and, among female inpatients, defendants with psychotic symptoms were twenty-nine times 
more likely to be found incompetent); see also Debra A. Pinals, Where Two Roads Meet: 
Restoration of Competence to Stand Trial from a Clinical Perspective, 31 NEW ENG. J. ON 
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 81, 84 (2005) (noting that “common symptoms of mental illness 
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Even if a future mass shooter did find themselves before a judge at 
some point, not every adjudication results in a finding that an individual is a 
“mental defective.”142 Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, for example, had been 
arrested for stealing electronics out of a car before they killed thirteen people 
at Columbine High School.143 Neither was found incompetent or insane.144 
Far from it. They were instead referred to a diversion program that kept 
young, promising, first-time offenders out of the legal system.145 
But if a person living with mental illness does come within the ambits 
of the court system, he can be adjudicated a mental defective in two ways. 
First, one is a mental defective if he “lacks the capacity to contract or manage 
his own affairs.”146 The few cases to have addressed the meaning of this 
language have used it to signify the court appointment of a guardian to 
provide for the individual’s needs.147 There is no indication that appointment 
of a guardian is correlated with violence; it is only correlated with severe 
mental illness, which is not itself an indicator of danger.148 This criterion is 
overinclusive to the point of irrelevance. 
“A danger to himself or others,” the second possible means of being 
adjudicated as a “mental defective,” is more closely aligned with the goals of 
violence prevention, but not by much. There are three problems with this 
criterion. First, mental health professionals, on whose opinions judges rely 
when making these decisions, are notoriously terrible at predicting danger 
and often overestimate an individual’s future risk. 149  One review of the 
literature found three central facts to be true: (1) mental health practitioners 
 
associated with findings of incompetence and leading to hospitalization include delusions 
(i.e., false, fixed beliefs), disorganized thoughts, and agitation”). Moreover, individuals 
found incompetent have not been convicted of any crime and may, in fact, be factually 
innocent of the accusations.  
142 See, e.g., State v. Buchanan, 924 A.2d 422, 424 (N.H. 2007) (finding that even a criminal 
defendant found incompetent to stand trial may not qualify as “adjudicated as a mental 
defective” because incompetence does not equate with either dangerousness or lacking 
mental capacity to contract or manage his own affairs). 
143 DAVE CULLEN, COLUMBINE 202 (2009). 
144 Id.  
145 Id. at 214, 217. 
146 27 C.F.R. § 478.11 (2019). 
147 See Petramala v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. CV-10-2002-PHX-FJM, 2011 WL 3880826, 
at *1 (D. Ariz. Sept. 2, 2011) (“[T]he court found that plaintiff is an incapacitated person as 
defined by statute and that the appointment of a guardian and conservator is necessary to 
provide for his demonstrated needs.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
148 See id. at *2 (noting that a finding that the defendant is a danger to himself or others is 
not necessary to classify the defendant as mentally defective). 
149 McMahon, supra note 140, at 635; see, e.g., JOHN MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT 
BEHAVIOR: AN ASSESSMENT OF CLINICAL TECHNIQUES 77 (1981) (finding that when 
psychiatrists and psychologists predict violent behavior three times, they are only correct for 
one of those three predictions). 
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“inaccurately make future violence predictions,” (2) they “lack training in 
making violence predictions,” and (3) their dangerousness predictions “are 
biased by their reliance on a number of cognitive heuristics, which causes 
them to overestimate rates of future violence.”150  
Second, even without the uncertainty introduced by the experts, 
dangerousness is a pliable concept that can vary considerably among 
jurists. The term is elastic and poorly defined, leaving much room for both 
bias and misapplication.151 As one judge noted, his decisions on whether 
an individual posed a threat of harm “were inevitably based upon my 
personal values and standards.”152 
Third, statutes defining “danger to self or others” often include 
indicators well beyond a risk of future violence or suicide. In some states, a 
lack of nourishment or self-care, or unwillingness to seek medical care, 
qualifies as a danger to self.153 Some states go so far as to include the prospect 
 
150 Daniel A. Krauss & Bruce D. Sales, The Effects of Clinical and Scientific Expert Testimony 
on Juror Decision Making in Capital Sentencing, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 267, 280-81 
(2001); see also Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 324 (1993) (“[M]any psychiatric predictions of 
future violent behavior by the mentally ill are inaccurate.”). But as Mulvey explains: 
[C]linicians indeed demonstrate some appreciable accuracy in assessing 
the likelihood of future violence in individuals with mental illness. 
However, this does not mean that clinicians are infallible or even that their 
conclusions are highly accurate in most situations. Rather, it only means 
that clinical judgments add a moderate amount of valid information to 
other factors known about the case. 
Edward P. Mulvey, Assessing the Likelihood of Future Violence in Individuals with Mental 
Illness: Current Knowledge and Future Issues, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 629, 632 (2005); see also  
Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise Redux, 56 EMORY L.J. 275, 283, 291 
(2006) (noting that success rates can only be fairly assessed by comparing the likelihood of 
accurate prediction to chance, and that a fifty percent accuracy rate could be far more 
accurate than a random assignment). 
151 See, e.g., MICHAEL PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 2A-4.2, 
cmt. (2d ed. 1998) (dangerousness remains “misunderstood, and poorly defined and 
conceptualized”). 
152 William M. Brooks, The Tail Still Wags the Dog: The Pervasive and Inappropriate 
Influence by the Psychiatric Profession on the Civil Commitment Process, 86 N.D. L. REV. 
259, 295 (2010) (quoting Judge Sees Lack of Guidelines for Committing Mental Patients, 
N.Y. L.J., Nov. 27, 1987, at 1). 
153 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2946(f)(3) (West, Westlaw through laws effective on or before 
July 1, 2019, enacted during 2019 Reg. Sess.) (defining “likely to cause harm to self or 
others” as including “substantially unable . . . to provide for any of the person’s basic needs”); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202A.011(2) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. & 2019 1st 
Extraordinary Sess.) (defining “danger” to include “actions which deprive self, family, or 
others of the basic means of survival, including provision for reasonable shelter, food and 
clothing”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 1 (West, Westlaw through ch. 88 of 2019 1st 
Ann. Sess.) (defining “likelihood of serious harm” to include “a very substantial risk of 
physical impairment or injury to the person himself as manifested by evidence the person’s 
 
 Journal of Law & Public Affairs [Jan. 2020 
 
   
 
28  
 
judgment is so affected that he is unable to protect himself in the community”); MISS. CODE 
ANN. §§ 41-21-73(4), 41-21-61(f) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.) (defining 
“substantial likelihood of physical harm” to include “a failure to provide necessary food, 
clothing, shelter, or medical care for himself”); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 632.350(5), 632.005(10) 
(West, Westlaw through 2019 1st Reg. & 1st Extraordinary Sess. of the 100th Gen. 
Assembly) (defining “likelihood of serious harm” to include “inability to provide for his 
basic necessities of food, clothing, shelter, safety, or medical or mental health care”); NEB. 
REV. STAT. §§ 71-925(1), 71-908 (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of 106th Leg. 
(2019)) (defining “substantial risk of serious harm” to include “evidence of inability to 
provide for his or her basic human needs, including food, clothing, shelter, essential medical 
care, or personal safety”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 433A.310(1), 433A.115(2) (LEXIS 
through 80th Reg. Sess., including all legislation effective May 28, 2019 or earlier) (defining 
“clear and present danger of harm” to include “[inability] to satisfy his or her need for 
nourishment, personal or medical care, shelter, self-protection, or safety”); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 135-C:34, 135-C:27(1) (West, Westlaw through ch. 346 of the 2019 Reg. Sess.) 
(defining “danger to himself” as including “lack [of] capacity to care for his own welfare 
[such] that there is a likelihood of death, serious bodily injury, or serious debilitation”); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-27.2(m), 30:4-27.2(h) (West, Westlaw through L. 2019, c. 267 and J.R. 
No. 22) (defining “dangerous to self” to include behaviors that indicate “the person is unable 
to satisfy his need for nourishment, essential medical care or shelter”); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 
43-1-11(E), 43-1-3(M) (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of the 54th Leg. (2019)) 
(defining “likelihood of serious harm to oneself” to include “grave passive neglect”); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 122C-268(j), 122C-3(11) (West, Westlaw through S.L. 2019-238 of the 
Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.) (defining “dangerous to self” to mean that the individual 
would be unable to “exercise self-control, judgment, and discretion in the conduct of his 
daily responsibilities and social relations, or to satisfy the individual’s need for nourishment, 
personal or medical care, shelter, or self-protection and safety”); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 
25-03.1-07, 25-03.1-02(14), (21) (West, Westlaw through legislation effective through Jan. 
1, 2020, from the 66th Gen. Assemb.) (defining “serious risk of harm” to mean “substantial 
deterioration in physical health, or substantial injury, disease, or death, based upon recent 
poor self-control or judgment in providing one’s shelter, nutrition, or personal care”); 50 PA. 
STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7304(a), 7301(b) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. 
Act 87) (defining “clear and present danger” to mean that person is “unable . . . to satisfy his 
need for nourishment, personal or medical care, shelter, or self-protection and safety”); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS §§ 27A-1-2, 27A-1-1(7) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Sess. Laws, Exec. 
Order 19-1 and Sup. Ct. Rule 19-18) (defining “danger to self” to include “an inability to 
provide for some basic human needs such as food, clothing, shelter, essential medical care, 
or personal safety, or by arrests for criminal behavior”); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 62A-15-
631(16), 62A-15-602(18) (West, Westlaw through 2019 1st Spec. Sess.) (defining 
“substantial danger” to include the incapability “of providing the basic necessities of life, 
including food, clothing, and shelter”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 7611, 7101(17) (West, 
Westlaw through Acts of Reg. Sess. of the 2019-2020 Vt. Gen. Assemb. (2019)) (defining 
“danger of harm to himself or herself” as including inability “to satisfy his or her need for 
nourishment, personal or medical care, shelter, or self-protection and safety”); W. VA. CODE 
ANN. §§ 27-5-4(k), 27-1-12(a)(5) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. with law of the 
2019 1st Extraordinary Sess. approved through Aug. 7, 2019) (defining “likely to cause 
serious harm” as including inability “to satisfy his or her need for nourishment, medical care, 
shelter or self-protection and safety”); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 51.20(1)(a)(1), 51.20(1)(a)(2) 
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of deteriorating mental health as a danger to oneself.154 In these jurisdictions, 
violence need not be on the horizon for one to be labeled dangerous. 
 
      2.  Committed to a Mental Institution 
 
The second path to disqualification, “committed to a mental 
institution,” is in most ways coextensive with “adjudicated as a mental 
defective.” This is in large part because many jurisdictions require either a 
judicial or quasi-judicial commitment proceeding and exclude from the 
definition individuals who were hospitalized on a temporary or emergency 
basis from the definition.155  A defendant who is committed to a mental 
institution by a court because he poses a danger to himself or others, one 
criterion for commitment in nearly every state,156 qualifies both under this 
 
(West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 5, published May 4, 2019) (defining “dangerous” as 
including an inability “to satisfy basic needs for nourishment, medical care, shelter or 
safety”); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-10-110(j), 25-10-101(a)(ii) (West, Westlaw through 2019 
Gen. Sess. of Wyo. Leg.) (defining “dangerous to himself or others” to include an inability 
“to satisfy basic needs for nourishment, essential medical care, shelter or safety”). 
154 See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE. §§ 25-03.1-07, 25-03.1-02(14), (21). 
155 See Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff's Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 681-82 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc) 
(stating that § 922(g)(4) “applies only to persons who are involuntarily committed by an 
appropriate judicial authority following due process safeguards”); United States v. 
Rehlander, 666 F.3d 45, 50 (1st Cir. 2012) (“[A] temporary hospitalization under section 
3863 does not constitute a ‘commitment’ under section 922”); United States v. Giardina, 861 
F.2d 1334, 1337 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that there is nothing in § 922(g) which indicates an 
intent to prohibit the possession of firearms by persons who had been hospitalized for 
observation and examination where they were found not to be mentally ill and were not 
committed); United States v. Hansel, 474 F.2d 1120, 1122-23 (8th Cir. 1973) (finding the same). 
156 ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.30.755(a) (West, Westlaw through Nov. 27, 2019 of the 2019 
1st Reg. Sess. & 2019 1st Spec. Sess. of the 31st Leg.); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-540(A) 
(West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of the 54th Leg. (2019)); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE 
§ 5250 (West, Westlaw through ch. 870 of the 2019 Reg. Sess.); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
27-65-109(4) (West, Westlaw through the 2019 Reg. Sess.); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-
498(c) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Jan. Reg. Sess. and the 2019 July Spec. Sess.); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 394.467(1) (West, Westlaw through 2019 1st Reg. Sess. of the 26th Leg.); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 37-3-1(9.1) (West, Westlaw through acts passed during the 2019 Sess. of the 
Gen. Assemb.); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 334-60.2 (West, Westlaw through Act 286 of the 
2019 Reg. Sess.); IDAHO CODE § 66-329(11) (West, Westlaw through 2019 1st Reg. Sess. of 
the 65th Idaho Leg.); 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1-119 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 101-
592); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-26-6-8(a) (West, Westlaw through 2019 1st Reg. Sess. of the 
121st Gen. Assemb.); IOWA CODE ANN. § 229.1(20) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. 
Sess.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2946(f) (West, Westlaw through laws effective on or before 
July 1, 2019, enacted during the 2019 Reg. Sess. of the Kan. Leg.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
202A.026 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. & 2019 1st Reg. Sess.); LA. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 28:55(E)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
123, § 1 (West, Westlaw through ch. 88 of 2019 1st Ann. Sess.); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
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prong of the definition and as being adjudicated as a “mental defective.” The 
under- and over-inclusiveness problems identified in the previous Section 
also apply here. 
But the “committed to a mental institution” definition also often captures 
a person who may be committed because he is “gravely disabled.”157 Depending 
 
§ 330.1401.(1) (West, Westlaw through P.A.2019, No. 131, of the 2019 Reg. Sess., 100th 
Leg.); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 41-21-73(4), 41-21-61(f) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. 
Sess.); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 632.350(5), 632.005(10) (West, Westlaw through 2019 1st Reg. 
& 1st Extraordinary Sess. of the 100th Gen. Assemb.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-126(1) 
(West, Westlaw through 2019 Sess.); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 71-925(1), 71-908 (West, 
Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of the 106th Leg. (2019)); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 433A.310(1), 
433A.115(2) (LEXIS through 80th Reg. Sess.); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 135-C:34, 135-
C:27(1) (Westlaw through ch. 346 of the 2019 Reg. Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-27.2(m), 
30:4-27.2(h) (West, Westlaw through L. 2019, c. 267 and J.R. No. 22); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 
43-1-11(E), 43-1-3(M) (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of the 54th Leg. (2019)); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 122C-268(j), 122C-3(11) (West, Westlaw through S.L. 2019-238 of the 
Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. §§ 25-03.1-07, 25-03.1-02(14), 
(21) (West, Westlaw through legislation effective through Jan. 1, 2020, from the 66th Gen. 
Assemb.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5122.15(C), 5122.01(B) (West, Westlaw through Files 
1 to 18 of the 133d Gen. Assemb. (2019-2020)); 50 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 
7304(a), 7301 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. Act 87); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-
580(A) (West, Westlaw through the 2019 Sess.); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 27A-1-2, 27A-1-
1(6)-(7) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Sess. Laws, Exec. Order 19-1 & Sup. Ct. Rule 19-
18); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.034(a) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. 
Sess. of the 86th Leg.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-15-631(16) (West, Westlaw through 2019 
1st Spec. Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 7611, 7101(17) (West, Westlaw through Acts of 
Reg. Sess. of the 2019-2020 Vt. Gen. Assemb. (2019)); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-817(C) 
(West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.05.240(3) (West, 
Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. of the Wash. Leg.); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 27-5-4(k), 27-
1-12(a) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. with law of the 2019 1st Extraordinary 
Sess. approved through Aug. 7, 2019); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 51.20(1)(a)(1), 51.20(1)(a)(2) 
(West, Westlaw through 2019 Act 5, published May 4, 2019); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-10-
110(j), 25-10-101(a)(ii) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Gen. Sess. of Wyo. Leg.). 
157 See Donald H. Stone, Confine Is Fine: Have the Non-Dangerous Mentally Ill Lost Their 
Right to Liberty?, 20 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 323, 325 (2012) (noting that forty-two states 
have criteria broader than dangerousness that include either a “grave disability” or “need for 
treatment”); see also ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.30.755(a); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-
540(A); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5250; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-65-109(4); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-498(c); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-329(11); IND. CODE ANN. § 12-26-
6-8(a); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:55(E)(1); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.05.240(3). For 
examples of these broad criteria, see MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1401.(1) (allowing 
commitment for an individual who “is unable to attend to his or her basic physical needs 
such as food, clothing, or shelter”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-21-126(1) (allowing 
commitment when the individual “is substantially unable to provide for the respondent’s own 
basic needs of food, clothing, shelter, health, or safety”); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-580(A) 
(allowing commitment when the individual “lacks sufficient insight or capacity to make 
responsible decisions with respect to his treatment”); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 
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on the definition adopted by the state, “gravely disabled” can capture a 
larger swath of people than those deemed dangerous or unable to manage 
their own affairs.158 Indiana, for example, defines “gravely disabled” to 
include any individual who, as a result of mental illness, is in danger of 
coming to harm because he “has a substantial impairment or obvious 
deterioration of that individual’s judgment, reasoning, or behavior that 
results in the individual’s inability to function independently.”159  
The breadth of that definition could include any individual who is 
in an acute phase of mental illness. Under this standard, one court upheld 
the commitment of an individual with mental illness who had lived on her 
own and held steady employment.160 But she refused medication with 
lithium and had arrived at the hospital in a manic state.161  The court 
committed her because “A.R. has a documented history of mental illness 
and would benefit from the medications prescribed to her, but she has 
failed or refused to either take the medications or take them in the manner 
prescribed.”162  
In some states, “gravely disabled” even includes individuals not 
currently symptomatic but who have given some indication that they will 
not comply with medication in the future. In Alaska, for example, a 
gravely disabled person is one who will “suffer . . .  severe abnormal, 
emotional, or physical distress, and this distress is associated with 
significant impairment of judgment, reason, or behavior causing a 
substantial deterioration of the person’s previous ability to function 
independently.” 163  This standard included a man who the trial court 
described as a “very nice person” and who, after treatment, had returned 
to being a “functioning human being” after being catatonic upon his 
admission to the hospital. 164  But his doctor testified that he probably 
would not take his medication in the future; as a result, the court ordered 
him committed as “gravely disabled.”165 
These individuals had no records of violence. They did nothing 
more than fail to take their prescribed medication or indicate that they may 
 
574.034(a) (allowing commitment when the defendant is experiencing “deterioration” in the 
ability to “function independently,” exhibited by an inability to provide for “basic needs, 
including food, clothing, health, or safety,” among other requirements). 
158 See Stone, supra note 157, at 325.  
159 IND. CODE ANN. § 12-7-2-96. 
160 Civil Commitment of A.R. v. Clarian Health Partners, Inc., No. 49A05-1011-MH-665, 
2011 WL 2472781 (Ind. Ct. App. Jun. 22, 2011). 
161 Id. at *1. 
162 Id. at *3.  
163 ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 47.30.915(9)(B). 
164 In re Jeffrey E., 281 P.3d 84, 88 (Alaska 2012). 
165 Id. at 88-89. 
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not do so in the future. 166  Yet they, too, are captured by the federal 
firearms restrictions. 
 
B. Broader Restrictions in Individual States 
 
Several states either track the language of the federal statute or largely 
capture the same groups of individuals as the federal statute in their firearms 
possession laws.167 A few go further and ban a broader spectrum of individuals 
 
166 See Stone, supra note 157, at 325-26 (“[The gravely disabled] criteria give judges broad 
discretion to make civil commitment decisions and overvalue the role of medication 
adherence in the treatment of mental illness.”). 
167 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-3101(7), 13-3102(4) (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. 
Sess. of the 54th Leg. (2019)) (prohibiting possession for one who has been found to be a 
danger to himself or others pursuant to court order; allowing for restoration of firearms 
possession); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-103(a) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. of the 
92d Ark. Gen. Assemb.) (forbidding possession of a firearm for individuals who have been 
adjudicated mentally ill or involuntarily committed to a mental institution); CAL. WELF. & 
INST. CODE § 8103 (West, Westlaw through ch. 870 of the 2019 Reg. Sess.) (allowing 
firearms possession when a person has received a certificate stating person may possess a 
firearm without endangering others); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-217c (West, Westlaw 
through 2019 Jan. Reg. Sess. & 2019 July Spec. Sess.) (barring individuals who either have 
been found not guilty due to a mental defect or have been confined in a mental hospital within 
the proceeding sixty months by order of a probate court); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1448 
(West) (West, Westlaw through ch. 219 of the 150th Gen. Assemb. (2019-2020)) (barring 
individuals involuntarily committed, or, for crimes of violence, found not guilty by reason 
of insanity, or found incompetent to stand trial, but allowing such individuals to petition for 
relief from the prohibition); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 790.064(1), 790.065(2) (West, Westlaw 
through 2019 1st Reg. Sess. of the 26th Leg.) (barring individuals who have been adjudicated 
mental defective or committed to a mental institution from possessing a firearm unless relief 
is obtained); IOWA CODE ANN. § 724.15(1)(c) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.) 
(prohibiting permits for those barred from firearms possession by federal law); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 21-6301(9) (West, Westlaw through laws effective on or before July 1, 2019, enacted 
during the 2019 Reg. Sess. of the Kan. Leg.) (defining criminal use of weapons to include 
“selling, giving or otherwise transferring any firearm to any person who is or has been a 
mentally ill person subject to involuntary commitment”); 15 ME. REV. STAT. § 393 (West, 
Westlaw through 2019 1st Reg. Sess. & ch. 531 of 1st Spec. Sess. of the 129th Leg.) (barring 
ownership, possession, or control when the individual “has been found not criminally 
responsible by reason of insanity” for certain enumerated crimes); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 28.422(3)(f)-(h) (West, Westlaw through P.A.2019, No. 131, of the 2019 Reg. Sess., 100th 
Leg.) (prohibiting issuance of a license to purchase or carry firearms when the person is 
under an order of involuntary commitment, inpatient or outpatient, or he has been adjudicated 
legally incapacitated); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.713(3), subd. 4 (West, Westlaw through 
legislation effective through Jan. 1, 2020 from the 2019 Reg. & 1st Spec. Sess.) (allowing 
for restoration of ability to possess a firearm); MO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571.070 (West, 
Westlaw through 2019 1st Reg. and 1st Extraordinary Sess. of the 100th Gen. Assemb.) 
(prohibiting firearms possession for those “currently adjudged mentally incompetent”); NEV. 
 
Vol. 5:2] Gun Laws and Mental Illness  
 
   
 
33 
 
with mental illness from owning guns.168 Hawaii, for example, bars anyone who 
 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 202.360(2) (West, Westlaw through 80th Reg. Sess. (2019)); N.Y. PENAL 
LAW § 400.00(1) (McKinney 2019); N.C. GEN STAT. ANN. § 14-404(c) (West, Westlaw 
through S.L. 2019-238 of the Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.) (preventing individuals who 
have been adjudicated mentally incompetent or have been committed to any mental 
institution from being issued permits to purchase or receive handguns); N.D. CENT. CODE 
ANN. §§ 62.1-02-01(1), 62.1-02-01.2 (West, Westlaw through legislation effective through 
Jan. 1, 2020, from the 66th Gen. Assemb.) (allowing for petitions for relief from prohibition); 
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 166.250(1) (LEXIS through 2019 Reg. Sess.) (prohibiting possession 
if individual was committed to Oregon Health Authority or was found to be a person with 
mental illness and “subject to an order . . . that the person be prohibited from purchasing or 
possessing firearms as a result of that mental illness”); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS.  STAT. ANN. 
§ 6105(c) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. Act 87) (prohibiting possession for any 
person who has been adjudicated as mentally incompetent or involuntarily committed to a 
mental institution for inpatient treatment); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-23-30 (Westlaw through the 
2019 Sess.) (barring sale or transfer of handguns rather than possession, but capturing the 
same individuals as federal law); id. § 44-23-1080 (barring possession of all firearms by 
individuals under the jurisdiction of the S.C. Department of Mental Health); VA. CODE ANN. 
§§ 18.2-308.1:2(A), 18.2-308.1:3(A) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.) (barring 
individuals who are found to be mentally incompetent or mentally incapacitated, or who have 
been involuntarily committed to a mental facility, from possessing a firearm); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 9.41.040 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. of the Wash. Leg.) 
(prohibiting possession by individuals found not guilty by reason of insanity or involuntarily 
committed, but allowing individuals to petition for relief from the ban); W. VA. CODE ANN. 
§ 61-7-7(a)(4) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. with law of the 2019 1st 
Extraordinary Sess. approved through Aug. 7, 2019) (preventing persons who have been 
adjudicated as mentally incompetent or who have been involuntarily committed to a mental 
institution from possessing a firearm and requiring immediate surrender of firearms once 
either circumstance occurs); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 941.29(1m), 51.20(13)(cv)1 (West, 
Westlaw through 2019 Act 5, published May 4, 2019); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-404(c)-(d) 
(West, Westlaw through 2019 Gen. Sess. of the Wyo. Leg.) (requiring that, in order to 
lawfully possess or purchase a firearm, a person must not currently be deemed legally 
incompetent and not have been committed to a mental institution).  
Some other states limit their mental health-related restrictions only to the issuance 
of permits to carry concealed handguns. See generally LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1379.3 
(Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 69-2433 (West, Westlaw 
through 1st Reg. Sess. of the 106th Leg. (2019)); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-19-4 (West, Westlaw 
through 1st Reg. Sess. of the 54th Leg. (2019)); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.125 (West, 
Westlaw through Files 1 to 18 of the 133d Gen. Assemb. (2019-2020)); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-
17-1351 (West, Westlaw through 2019 1st Extraordinary Sess. of the 111th Tenn. Gen. 
Assemb.); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.172 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. of the 
86th Leg.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-5-704 (West, Westlaw through 2019 1st Spec. Sess.). 
168 I note below the ways in which these statutes expand upon the federal prohibition. Unless 
otherwise noted, these statutes also capture those groups prohibited from possessing a 
firearm by federal law. ALA. CODE 1975 § 13A-11-72(a) (Westlaw through Act 2019-540) 
(stating that “[n]o person . . . of unsound mind shall own a firearm or have one in his or her 
possession or under his or her control”); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 8100(a) (West, 
Westlaw through ch. 870 of 2019 Reg. Sess.) (barring individuals who have been “admitted 
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“[i]s or has been diagnosed as having a significant behavioral, emotional, or 
mental disorder” from possessing a gun.169  
Only a prohibition this broad could have prevented James Holmes 
from purchasing guns. But forty-six percent of Americans have been 
diagnosed with a mental illness at some point in their lives.170 Hawaii seems 
to count them all as presumptively dangerous.171 
From the perspective of preventing gun violence, the Hawaii approach is 
closer to the ideal gun restriction, as it bars large portions of the population from 
having guns. But the problem with the Hawaii statute is that it conditions 
ownership on a lack of diagnosed mental illness. It does not say to everyone that 
you cannot have a firearm. It says this only to those who have visited a psychiatrist 
 
to a facility and [are] receiving inpatient treatment” whom the attending health professional 
believes are a danger to themselves or others); D.C. Code Ann. § 7-2502.03(a)(6) (West, 
Westlaw through Nov. 26, 2019) (barring individuals confined to a mental health facility 
voluntarily or involuntarily within five-year period preceding application); HAW. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 134-7(c) (West, Westlaw through Act 286 of 2019 Reg. Sess.) (barring possession 
or control of firearms when the individual “is or has been diagnosed as having significant 
behavioral, emotional, or mental disorders”); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/24-3.1(a) (West, 
Westlaw through P.A. 101-592) (barring possession by individuals who have been a 
patient in a mental institution within the past five years); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 
5-133(b) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.) (barring 
individuals who “suffer[] from a mental disorder . . .and [have] a history of violent 
behavior against the person or another” or have “been voluntarily admitted for more than 
30 consecutive days” to a mental health treatment facility); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
140, § 131 (West, Westlaw through ch. 88 of 2019 1st Ann. Sess.) (including individuals 
who have been “committed to a hospital or institution for mental illness” with or without 
a court order); MISS. CODE ANN. § 45-9-101(2) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess.) 
(including individuals who have been either voluntarily or involuntarily committed, but 
limits restrictions to “stun guns, concealed weapons, or revolvers”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
2c:58-3(c) (West, Westlaw through L.2019, c. 267 and J.R. No. 22) (prohibiting issuance 
of firearms purchase license if the individual has “ever been confined for a mental 
disorder” unless person produces proof that he is no longer incapacitated); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 21, § 1289.12 (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg. Sess. of the 57th Leg. (2019)) 
(prohibiting sale or transfer of various firearms to “any individual who . . . is mentally or 
emotionally unbalanced or disturbed”); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 11-47-6 (West, Westlaw 
through ch. 310 of 2019 Reg. Sess.) (prohibiting individuals under “treatment” by virtue 
of being mentally incompetent from possessing firearms). 
169 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134-7(c)(3).  
170 FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, A STUDY OF THE PRE-ATTACK BEHAVIORS OF ACTIVE 
SHOOTERS, supra note 41, at 17; see also Debra J. Brody et al., NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH 
STATISTICS DATA, PREVALENCE OF DEPRESSION AMONG ADULTS AGED 20 AND OVER: 
UNITED STATES, 2013–2016 1 (2018), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/databriefs/db303 
.htm [https://perma.cc/AC4A-6XLH] (finding that eight percent of Americans suffered from 
depression in any two-week period between 2013 and 2016). 
171 That said, the statute does allow individuals with a past diagnosis to possess a gun when 
they have been “medically documented to be no longer adversely affected by the . . . mental 
disease, disorder, or defect.” HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134-7(c). 
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and received a diagnosis, deeming them de facto dangerous, and thus further 
cementing the association in the public mind between mental illness and violence.  
 
* * * 
 
To sum up, the mental illness gun bans of the states and the federal 
government are tied to some concrete indicator of mental illness, be that a court 
finding, a hospital commitment, or a diagnosis. By focusing on these tangible 
indicia, these laws are vastly overinclusive and underinclusive. They call the 
“nice” person who may not take his medication in the future too dangerous 
to be trusted with firearms,172 but fail to capture Stephen Paddock,173 Omar 
Mateen, 174  Adam Lanza, 175  Nikolas Cruz, 176  Jared Loughner, 177  James 
Holmes,178 or many other mass shooters.179  
A recent study of a law strengthening background checks bears out 
the conclusion that these laws do little to stem gun violence.180 Connecticut 
 
172  In re Jeffrey E., 281 P.3d 84, 88 (Alaska 2012). 
173 Supra notes 18–24 and accompanying text. 
174 Adam Goldman, Joby Warrick & Max Bearak, “He Was Not a Stable Person”: Orlando 
Shooter Showed Signs of Emotional Trouble, WASH. POST (June 12, 2016), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/ex-wife-of-suspected-orlando-shooter-he-beat 
-me/2016/06/12/8a1963b4-30b8-11e6-8ff7-7b6c1998b7a0_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/8GSL-8PAC] (“Mateen had a blemish-free record when he applied for a 
Florida license to carry concealed weapons and again when he legally purchased two 
firearms . . . just a few days before the shootings.”). 
175 See Alison Leigh Cowan, Adam Lanza’s Mental Problems ‘Completely Untreated’ Before 
Newtown Shooting, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/22/ 
nyregion/before-newtown-shootings-adam-lanzas-mental-problems-completely-untreated-
report-says.html [https://perma.cc/DR8Q-T359] (citing a report by medical experts, which 
found that Lanza’s mother refused medication and other treatments for her son before the 
shooting and that made no mention of commitments to a mental health facility or 
adjudications of mental illness). 
176 See Phil McCausland, Florida Mental Health Agency Examined Cruz in 2016, Didn’t 
Hospitalize Him, NBCNEWS.COM (Feb. 19, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-
news/social-media-post-led-florida-agency-investigate-nikolas-cruz-2016-n849221 [https:// 
perma.cc/C9A3-ZLR9] (explaining that crisis workers chose not to hospitalize Cruz after 
being called to perform a psychiatric evaluation on him). 
177 See McCreary, supra note 12, at 819 (“Both Loughner and Holmes had previously shown 
signs of mental illness . . . . Both Loughner and Holmes purchased their guns, seemingly 
legally, from federally licensed firearms dealers.”). 
178 Id. 
179 The overwhelming majority of mass shooters obtain their guns legally and pass federal 
background checks. See Bonnie Berkowitz et al., The Terrible Numbers that Grow with Each 
Mass Shooting, WASH. POST (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/ 
2018/national/mass-shootings-in-america/ [https://perma.cc/W27L-GHDN] (finding that, of 
the 239 guns whose method of acquisition is known, 181, or seventy-five percent, were 
obtained legally).  
180 Swanson et al., supra note 38, at 373. 
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enacted legislation to report gun-disqualifying mental health records to the 
National Instant Criminal Background Check System in 2007. 181 
Presumably, after this change, individuals who were disqualified under the 
federal law would be unable to purchase a firearm at the point of sale; this 
had not been true before this reporting change. But the law made little 
difference to the violent crime rates. Researchers estimated that violent crime 
among individuals with serious mental illness was reduced by less than one-
half of one percent.182 
These laws thus do little to solve the problem of gun violence in 
general or mass shootings in particular, and they only serve to put a legislative 
stamp of approval on the stereotype of the dangerous “crazed lunatic.”183  
 
III. THE DANGEROUSNESS MYTH AND ITS HARMS 
 
The problem with these laws, and with most calls for legislation 
dealing with “mental health” in the wake of violent events, is that they are 
based on bias, not reality. They target the anecdotal violent outlier with 
mental illness while ignoring the many, many violent individuals who have 
no mental health condition. 
That bias is prevalent throughout our society; individuals with mental 
illness are likely the most stigmatized group of people in the United States 
today. The bias against them is on par with that held against individuals 
because of their race, gender, or physical disabilities.184 Michael Perlin has 
 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183  See Bacon & Jones, supra note 2. While my argument is a normative one, not a 
constitutional one—my plea is for legislatures to repeal these statutes rather than courts to 
strike them down—a strong argument can be made that these laws are unconstitutional as 
applied. At least one circuit court has already taken steps towards invalidating these 
provisions as a Second Amendment violation. See, e.g., Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s 
Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 698 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Under intermediate scrutiny, a statute can 
permissibly regulate more conduct (or more people) than necessary. However, the amount 
of overreach must be reasonable, and it is the government’s burden, not Tyler’s, to prove that 
§ 922(g)(4)’s ‘scope is in proportion to the interest served.’” (citations omitted)); see also 
Keyes v. Lynch, 195 F. Supp. 3d 702, 722 (M.D. Pa. 2016) (finding § 922(g)(4) to violate 
the Second Amendment because the plaintiff is “‘no more dangerous than a typical law-
abiding citizen’ at this point in this life, and that he is not a ‘continuing threat’ to himself or 
others” (citations omitted)). 
184 See MICHAEL PERLIN, A PRESCRIPTION FOR DIGNITY: RETHINKING CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
AND MENTAL DISABILITY LAW 17 (2013) (“‘Sanism’ is an irrational prejudice of the same 
quality and character of other irrational prejudices [such as] racism, sexism, homophobia, 
and ethnic bigotry . . . . Discrimination pervades the lives of people with psychiatric 
diagnosis.”); Michael E. Waterstone & Michael Ashley Stein, Disabling Prejudice, 102 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1351, 1364 (2008) (noting researchers have found that individuals with mental 
disabilities experience “greater prejudice” than individuals with physical disabilities). 
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described this bias as “sanism,” and has shown how it gives birth to several 
deeply held myths about individuals with mental illness.185  
One especially resonant myth is that individuals with mental health 
conditions are dangerous.186 A 2013 national survey found that forty-six 
percent of Americans believed that persons with serious mental illness were, 
“by far, more dangerous than the general population.”187 This is particularly 
true of individuals with a psychotic disorder, like schizophrenia. In one study, 
participants were read a vignette describing a person with schizophrenic 
symptoms.188 Sixty percent of respondents reported that the individual was 
somewhat likely, or very likely, to hurt others, even though the description 
made no mention of violent behavior.189 
The harm that this stigma does to individuals who suffer from mental 
illness is physical, financial, social, and emotional. In a very real way, our 
unquestioned link between violence and mental illness, as enshrined in and 
furthered by our gun laws, makes an individual with mental illness more 
likely to die from an interaction with police or while in jail, restricts him from 
earning a living, undercuts support for public programs that could ease the 
burden of living with mental illness, and discourages him from seeking 
treatment for his condition. 
First, the criminal justice implications. People experiencing 
symptoms of mental illness are arrested by the police more often for the same 
crimes than people who are not mentally ill.190 Police also tend to believe that 
 
185  See PERLIN, supra note 184, at 17-24 (describing myths including not only the 
dangerousness myth, but also myths such as that those living with mental illness are 
presumptively incompetent to participate in “normal” activities, should be segregated in large, 
distant institutions, do not exercise self-restraint, and are lazy, erratic, and morally deviant). 
186 See Swanson et al., supra note 38, at 367 (“Negative public attitudes toward persons with 
serious mental illnesses such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder are pervasive and 
persistent in the United States, and the assumption of dangerousness is a key element of this 
negative stereotype.”). 
187 Colleen L. Barry et al., After Newtown—Public Opinion on Gun Policy and Mental 
Illness, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1077, 1078-80 tbl.2 (2013). 
188 Bernice A. Pescosolido et al., “A Disease Like Any Other”? A Decade of Change in 
Public Reactions to Schizophrenia, Depression, and Alcohol Dependence, 167 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 1321, 1322 (2010). 
189 Id. at 1324. 
190  See Patrick Corrigan, How Stigma Interferes with Mental Health Care, 59 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 614, 616 (2004) (discussing that “persons exhibiting signs and symptoms of 
serious mental illness” face a greater likelihood of arrest by the police); Linda A. Teplin, 
Criminalizing Mental Disorder: The Comparative Arrest Rate of the Mentally Ill, 39 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 794, 798-99 (1984) (finding that the probability of arrest was twenty percent 
higher for individuals with symptoms of a mental disorder compared to those without such 
symptoms); cf. JENNIFER BRONSON & MARCUS BERZOFSKY,  DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INDICATORS 
OF MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS REPORTED BY PRISONERS AND JAIL INMATES, 2011–2012, at 1 
(2017) (finding that forty-four percent of jail inmates had a history of a mental health problem). 
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individuals with mental illness are more inclined to violence than others.191 
This fear may lead to more aggressive reactions to the unpredictable 
behaviors of individuals with mental illness. 
Of the 986 people shot and killed by police in the United States in 
2017, at least one in four had a mental health condition.192 An investigation 
of police shootings in Portland, Maine, found that fifty-eight percent of those 
shot and killed by police had a mental health condition. 193  Even when 
encounters are not lethal, police use force disproportionately against 
individuals with mental illness.194  
Studies of these encounters have shown that police perceive 
individuals with mental illness to be resisting officers at higher rates than 
individuals without mental illness.195 It could be that these individuals are 
actually engaging in these activities at higher rates; it could also be that police 
officers believe them to be resisting arrest and acting disrespectfully, in part 
because of the deep-seated societal fear of individuals with mental illness.196 
Even if individuals with mental illness survive their encounters with 
police, they then are enmeshed in the criminal justice system, where they are 
more likely to be confined awaiting trial, more likely to be abused physically 
 
191 See Dragana Kesic et al., Use of Nonfatal Force on and by Persons with Apparent Mental 
Disorder in Encounters with Police, 40 CRIM. JUST.  & BEHAV. 321, 322 (2013) (noting that 
despite few studies on the topic, “findings [suggest] that many police believe that dealing 
with persons experiencing mental illness is dangerous because of their propensity for violent 
behavior” (citations omitted)). 
192 Fatal Force, WASH. POST (2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/national/ 
police-shootings-2017/ [https://perma.cc/R4K5-FYC8]; see also E. FULLER TORREY ET AL., 
TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDES BY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS: 
WHAT IS THE ROLE OF MENTAL ILLNESS? 3 (2013) (summarizing a 2012 investigation, which 
included hundreds of interviews and thousands of pages of documents, that concluded at least 
half of the people shot and killed by police between 1980 and 2008 had mental health problems). 
193 Deadly Force: Police and the Mentally Ill, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Dec. 8, 2012), 
http://www.pressherald.com/special/Maine_police_deadly_force_series_Day_1.html [https: 
//perma.cc/88DP-63RZ]. 
194 Michael T. Rossler & William Terrill, Mental Illness, Police Use of Force, and Citizen 
Injury, 20 POLICE Q. 190, 199-200 (2016); see also Kesic et al., supra note 191, at 331 
(finding that police in Victoria, Australia were twice as likely to use pepper spray against 
those who appeared mentally disordered); Melissa Morabito et al., The Nature and Extent of 
Police Use of Force in Encounters with People with Behavioral Health Disorders, 50 INT’L 
J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 31, 34-35 (2015) (finding that individuals with a perceived mental illness 
and/or substance abuse disorders were significantly more likely to have physical force used 
against them than those with no perceived disorders). 
195 See id. at 35 (finding that officers perceived resistance, aggressive resistance, or both in 
70.71% of use-of-force encounters with individuals with perceived mental illness; officers 
perceived individuals with no mental illness to resist 37.44% of the time). 
196  See Kesic et al., supra note 191, at 322-23 (noting contrary findings on whether 
individuals with mental illness acted more aggressively toward police than individuals 
without mental illness). 
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while awaiting trial, and more likely to die while awaiting trial.197 Just a few 
examples of this: In New Mexico, defendants found incompetent to stand trial 
were held before trial for more than a year longer than arrestees without 
mental health conditions.198 In South Carolina, guards used force against 
inmates with mental illness 2.5 times more than against other inmates.199  
Second, employment and housing prospects. Employers are less 
likely to hire those with mental health conditions.200 This stigma is due, in 
part, to the perception that those with mental illness are violent and 
dangerous.201  For example, a survey of business students found that, as 
compared to other disabilities, mental illness produced greater discomfort 
because the disorder was “seen as . . . threatening.”202 In a different study, 
sixty-seven percent of employers expressed “discomfort” with hiring 
someone who is taking antipsychotic medication.203  One employer, when 
discussing mental disability, stated, “you have a responsibility to other 
employees to keep someone who might be unstable—that is, violent—from 
hurting other employees.”204 
Little research has been done on housing discrimination against 
individuals with mental illness, but the studies so far have shown a similar 
unwillingness to have individuals with mental illness in close proximity. For 
example, in one study, prospective renters called landlords about advertised 
apartments and, in some cases, alluded to a history of mental illness. Callers 
who mentioned mental illness were three times as likely to be met with a 
negative response.205 They received the same amount of negative responses 
 
197 McMahon, supra note 140, at 613-17. 
198 Id. at 610-11. 
199 Id. at 615. 
200 See Stijn Baert et al., First Depressed, then Discriminated Against?, 170 SOC. SCI. & 
MED. 247, 253 (2016) (finding that, for individuals who disclose depression as the reason 
for a year of unemployment, the probability of being asked for a job interview decreased by 
about a third as compared to those who had no break in employment); cf. Teresa L. Scheid, 
Stigma as a Barrier to Employment: Mental Disability and the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, 28 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 670, 682 (2005) (finding that companies who did not 
comply with ADA requirements on hiring individuals with mental disabilities were more 
likely to hold stigmatizing attitudes toward people with mental illness). 
201 Id. at 674. The stigma is borne of other false perceptions as well: that individuals with 
mental illness are not only dangerous, but also “unpredictable, . . . irrational, slow, stupid, 
and unreliable.” Id. at 673. 
202 Id. at 674 (citing Gary L. Albrecht et al., Social Distance from the Stigmatized: A Test of 
Two Theories, 16 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1319 (1982)). 
203 Teresa L. Scheid, Employment of Individuals with Mental Disabilities: Business Response 
to the ADA’s Challenge, 17 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 73, 87 (1999). 
204 Id.  
205 Stewart Page, Effects of the Mental Illness Label in Attempts to Obtain Accommodation, 
9 CANADIAN J. BEHAV. SCI. 85, 88 (1977).  
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as callers who asked for information on behalf of an imprisoned brother.206 
This hesitance is likely due to the fear of individuals with mental 
illness. In one recent poll, when people were asked how they felt about an 
individual with serious mental illness living next door to them, forty-seven 
percent expressed discomfort with the idea.207 
Community opposition to housing projects for individuals with 
mental illness provides further anecdotal confirmation that these individuals 
are feared as dangerous and face discrimination in housing as a result. While 
opponents to such projects often cite supposedly neutral concerns such as 
traffic or property values as the source of their protest, case studies indicate 
that the concerns are more often driven by negative stereotypes, such as the 
fear that residents with mental illness will become violent. For example, in 
Great Britain, a new community residence was met with protestors carrying 
signs that said “Paranoid Schizophrenic Out!” and “Keep Our Children 
Safe!”208 In New York, a concerned resident at a meeting for a planned 
housing for people with mental illness asked, “Do we need to be concerned 
that these people will be out for the day and just grab and stab someone?”209 
Third, allocation of public resources. While this phenomenon has not 
been studied extensively in the realm of mental health, at least one study 
indicated that when the public fears people with mental illness or perceives 
them as dangerous, they are less likely to support allocation of resources to 
programs designed to help those individuals.210  Perhaps as a result, less 
money is spent on research of mental illness than on other health disorders.211  
Treatment of mental health conditions is also drastically 
underfunded.  The budgets of public mental health facilities have been cut 
and available bed space is woefully inadequate, which leaves many 
 
206 Id. at 87-88. 
207 Kaiser Health Tracking Poll: February 2013, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Feb. 
27, 2013), https://www.kff.org/disparities-policy/poll-finding/kaiser-health-tracking-poll-
february-2013/ [https://perma.cc/6F7R-39X8]. 
208 PHILIP T. YANOS, WRITTEN OFF: MENTAL HEALTH STIGMA AND THE LOSS OF HUMAN 
POTENTIAL 51 (2018). 
209 Id. 
210 See Patrick Corrigan et al., An Attribution Model of Public Discrimination Towards 
Persons with Mental Illness, 44 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 162, 172-73 (2003) (finding that 
perceptions of dangerousness may result in support for coercive treatment and withholding 
of help); Patrick Corrigan et al., Stigmatizing Attitudes about Mental Illness and Allocation 
of Resources to Mental Health Services, 40 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 297, 298 (2004) 
(suggesting that prejudice against individuals with mental illness may result in less funding 
for mental health services promoting independent living); see also Swanson et al., supra note 
38, at 367 (“Public perceptions and attitudes towards persons with mental illness are 
important to public policy, because people act on the basis of their beliefs, and they tend to 
support policies that assume those beliefs and perceptions to be true.”). 
211 PATRICK W. CORRIGAN, THE STIGMA EFFECT 53 (2018). 
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symptomatic people locked out of mental health treatment altogether.212 
Many psychiatrists and other mental health professionals also often opt 
out of the public mental health care system, where most individuals with 
severe mental illnesses are treated, leaving facilities understaffed and few 
options for community care. 213  This is unsurprising; private health 
systems are better funded than public ones, and their employees can earn 
better salaries and benefits.214  
Fourth, treatment-seeking behavior. Less than thirty percent of 
individuals with a mental health condition attempt to treat it.215 Even those 
who do seek treatment usually fail to adhere to their treatment regimens; 
on average, more than forty percent of individuals receiving antipsychotic 
medication failed to take the medication as prescribed.216 
One factor driving this failure is the shame associated with mental 
illness.  The label of “dangerous,” and the shame that such a label carries, 
can discourage individuals from seeking mental health treatment. People 
who expressed a sense of shame about mental illness were less likely to 
seek treatment, as were people who believed family members would be 
ashamed of a relative diagnosed as mentally ill.217  
To sum up, a narrative that individuals with mental illness are 
dangerous contributes to their arrest and abuse by police, their detention 
in jails and institutions, their poverty and homelessness, and underfunding 
of programs to help them, and imposes such shame that individuals are 
unwilling to seek treatment. Associating the mentally ill with violent acts, 
as statutes barring them from possessing weapons implicitly do, hardens 
this connection and thus worsens all the harms that result from the 
dangerousness stigma.  
 
 
 
 
212 See, e.g., NAT’L ALL. ON MENTAL ILLNESS, STATE MENTAL HEALTH CUTS: A NATIONAL 
CRISIS 1 (2011) (noting that states had cut $1.6 billion in mental health spending from 2009 
to 2011); Michelle R. Smith, Kennedy’s Vision for Mental Health Never Materialized, MOD. 
HEALTHCARE (Oct. 20, 2013), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20131020/INFO/ 
310209993/kennedy-s-vision-for-mental-health-never-realized [https://perma.cc/RB2Z-2LNV] 
(“[A]bout 90 percent of beds have been cut at state hospitals . . . In many cases, several 
mental health experts said, that has left nowhere for the sickest people to turn . . . .”). 
213 CORRIGAN, supra note 211, at 53-54; see also NAT’L ALL. ON MENTAL ILLNESS, supra 
note 212, at 6-8 (outlining the far-reaching implications of budget cuts, resulting in the 
unavailability of crucial mental health services). 
214 CORRIGAN, supra note 211, at 53-54. 
215  Patrick Corrigan, How Stigma Interferes with Mental Health Care, 59 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 614, 615 (2004). 
216 Id. 
217 Id. at 618. 
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IV. FLAWS IN THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR MENTAL ILLNESS GUN BANS  
 
Despite the many problems with mental illness gun bans, they remain 
wildly popular, likely for two reasons. First, these bans make intuitive sense. 
Society harbors a deep fear of individuals with mental illness, and no less an 
authority than the Supreme Court has called these kinds of laws constitutional 
restrictions on the right to bear arms.218 Second, it is one of the few areas upon 
which gun safety advocates and gun rights advocates can reach agreement and 
thus seems to be fertile soil for compromise.219 
Both of these reasons are specious in light of the ineffectiveness of 
mental illness gun bans and the great harms they cause individuals living with 
mental health conditions, as outlined above. Yet other justifications for this 
approach may hold some weight. From an empirical perspective, the risk of 
suicide by firearm is high among individuals with mental illness and may be 
a valid reason to prohibit those with mental illness from owning these 
weapons.220 From a public policy perspective, opponents of eliminating these 
laws could argue that removing them will have its own negative effects that 
may outweigh even the harm from the dangerousness stigma. 
While these arguments do give me pause, they ultimately do not outweigh 
the damage wrought by these statutes, as illustrated in more detail below. 
 
A. Guns and Suicide 
 
The one circumstance where the evidence may support a ban on 
individuals with mental illness from possessing firearms is when those 
individuals are at risk of suicide. While this is rarely used as the justification 
for mental illness gun bans,221 it is the justification that has the most empirical 
support and the support of experts in mental illness and gun policy.222 Yet 
 
218 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008). 
219 See, e.g., Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act, S. 7026, § 10,  2016 
Sen., Reg. Sess. (Fl. 2018) (including provision banning those adjudicated as “mentally 
defective” or committed to a mental institution from possessing firearms); Domenico 
Montanaro, Poll: Most Americans Want to See Congress Pass Gun Restrictions, NPR (Sept. 
10, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/09/10/759193047/poll-most-americans-want-to-see-
congress-pass-gun-restrictions [https://perma.cc/EA8B-RMX3] (describing results from a 
poll that showed the highest proportion of people—eighty-nine percent—favored increasing 
funding for mental health screenings and treatment as a solution to gun violence). 
220 See Frederick E. Vars & Amanda Adcock Young, Do the Mentally Ill Have a Right to 
Bear Arms?, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 23 (2013) (“[T]he stronger, and probably 
constitutionally adequate, rationale [for gun restrictions] is suicide prevention.”). 
221 Id. 
222 See, e.g., CONSORTIUM FOR RISK-BASED FIREARM POLICY, GUNS, PUBLIC HEALTH, AND 
MENTAL ILLNESS 3 (2013) (recommending stronger state laws to prevent gun ownership 
following short-term involuntary hospitalization). 
Vol. 5:2] Gun Laws and Mental Illness  
 
   
 
43 
 
even this justification fails under scrutiny. 
First, the risks. Of the 39,773 people fatally shot in 2017, nearly two-
thirds (23,854 people) died by suicide.223 It is, by far, the largest death toll by 
guns in the United States.224 
Studies have indicated that mental illness increases the danger of an 
individual dying by suicide.225 As one meta-analysis noted, “[V]irtually all 
mental disorders have an increased risk of suicide excepting mental 
retardation and possibly dementia and agoraphobia.”226 And in psychological 
autopsies of individuals who died by suicide—meaning reviews of that 
person’s medical history and interviews with family and friends after their 
death—ninety-one percent of those who died had a diagnosable mental 
disorder, most often a mood disorder such as major depression.227 
In addition, suicide attempts with a firearm tend to be vastly more 
successful than attempts by other means. One study showed that 82.5% of 
suicide attempts involving a gun resulted in death; the next-highest successful 
means—drowning—was only successful about sixty-six percent of the 
time.228 Suicide by ingesting poison or cutting oneself was successful less 
than two percent of the time.229  
The conclusion from these two data points seems fairly 
straightforward: Individuals with mental illness have a high risk of suicide 
and should be prevented from possessing firearms, which make suicide 
attempts more deadly.230 But some wrinkles complicate this story. 
 First, most individuals with a mental illness will not die by suicide. 
The lifetime risk for dying by suicide is somewhere between two and eight 
percent for individuals who live with mental disorders,231 and it is nearly 
 
223 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, WONDER DATABASE, FIREARMS DEATHS BY 
INTENT, 1999-2017 (2017), https://wonder.cdc.gov/controller/datarequest/D76;jsessionid 
=806629A0D9826D46E3BDA91A8557D4F6 [https://perma.cc/T3BX-DAQ5]. 
224 See id. (noting that homicides, the second-highest injury intent, accounted for 14,542 
firearms deaths in 2017). 
225  See, e.g., E. Clare Harris & Brian Barraclough, Suicide as an Outcome for Mental 
Disorders, 170 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 205, 222 (1997) (conducting a meta-analysis and 
finding an increased suicide risk for most mental disorders). 
226 Id. 
227 Jonathan Cavanagh et al., Psychological Autopsy Studies of Suicide: A Systematic Review, 
33 PSYCHOL. MED. 395, 399 (2003). 
228 Rebecca S. Spicer & Ted R. Miller, Suicide Acts in 8 States: Incidence and Case Fatality 
Rates by Demographics and Method, 90 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1885, 1888 (2000). 
229 Id. 
230 Many scholars and mental health experts agree with this conclusion. See, e.g., CONSORTIUM 
FOR RISK-BASED FIREARM POLICY, supra note 222, at 3 (recommending stronger state laws to 
prevent gun ownership following short-term involuntary hospitalization). 
231 See Merete Nordentoft et al., Absolute Risk of Suicide After First Hospital Contact in 
Mental Disorder, 68 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1058, 1061 (2011) (identifying the 
absolute risk rates for suicide). 
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impossible to predict who in the group labeled mentally ill will take their 
own life.232 One group of researchers took a group of depressed patients 
and attempted to design a model that would predict which ones would die 
by suicide. Not a single prediction was correct; every person tagged as 
likely to die by suicide did not do so, and the program missed every person 
who did die by suicide. 233  This stunning failure led one researcher to 
conclude that “suicide is difficult or impossible to predict, even among a 
high-risk group of inpatients.”234 
Thus, even if suicide were the justification for banning firearms 
from those with mental health conditions, it would vastly overreach. Such 
a restriction paints all individuals with mental illness as suicidal, when that 
is not the case. 
Second, suicide is often not the endpoint of a steady march through 
worsening depression, as many imagine it to be. While some individuals 
undergo treatment and suffer depression for many years before completing 
suicide,235  many others, up to fifty-four percent, according to a recent 
study, did not have a previously known mental health issue.236 For these 
individuals, suicide is spurred by despair, dark nights of the soul, or a major 
negative life event—loss of wealth or status, loss of a loved one through 
death or divorce, or loss of physical health.237  
Retrospective studies of suicides, like the psychological autopsies 
mentioned above, further the “we should have seen it coming” narrative, 
which is often incorrect. Psychological autopsies of persons who died by 
 
232  See Rise B. Goldstein et al., The Prediction of Suicide: Sensitivity, Specificity, and 
Predictive Value of a Multivariate Model Applied to 1906 Patients with Affective Disorders, 
48 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY  418, 422 (1991) (concluding that it is unrealistic to expect 
medical professionals to predict suicide based on logistic progression studies). 
233 Id. at 420. 
234 José Manoel Bertolote et al., Psychiatric Diagnosis and Suicide: Revisiting the Evidence, 
25 CRISIS 147, 147 (2004). 
235 See Nell Greenfield Boyce, CDC: U.S. Suicide Rates Have Climbed Dramatically, NPR 
(June 7, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/06/07/617897261/cdc-u-s-
suicide-rates-have-climbed-dramatically [https://perma.cc/L3C7-HKNZ] (noting that Michael 
Anestis, who researches suicide, “thinks the general public commonly pictures someone who 
had been getting treatment for a long period before killing themselves, like fashion designer 
Kate Spade, who died this week, but that's often not the case”). 
236 Id. 
237 See, e.g., Maria Christina Verrochio et al., Mental Pain and Suicide: A Systematic Review 
of the Literature, 7 FRONTIERS PSYCHOL., June 20, 2016, at 11 (“[T]he results indicate that 
levels of mental pain are associated with an increased risk of suicide, independently from the 
severity of depressive condition.”); Greenfield Boyce, supra note 235 (citing author of a 
study on increased suicide rates who said that “[people with no mental health diagnosis] were 
suffering from other issues, such as relationship problems, substance misuse, physical health 
problems, job or financial problems, and recent crises or things that were coming up in their 
lives that they were anticipating”). 
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suicide rest on interviews with individuals close to the person.238 Such studies 
are susceptible to hindsight biases; when looking back on a life that ended in 
suicide, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that signs of depression were 
apparent all along.239  
By insisting upon the suicide–mental illness connection, we leave 
much of the population vulnerable. Studies from non-Western countries have 
shown the impact of risk factors aside from mental illness. In South Asian 
countries, gender roles, cultural expectations, family conflict, and domestic 
violence heightened rates of female suicide, while alcohol use, financial 
issues, and interpersonal conflict are risk factors for male suicide in India.240 
A focus solely on mental illness as the suicide risk leaves vulnerable many 
people who cannot cope with life stressors. 
Third, the stigma surrounding mental health conditions, which mental 
illness gun bans help to perpetuate, could itself worsen the suicide risk. 
Individuals may be less likely to seek treatment for fear of the danger label, 
and lack of treatment increases suicide risk.241 Moreover, feelings of shame 
have been linked to suicide, and researchers suspect that some portion of the 
suicides associated with mental illness happen because the person sees herself 
as “defective and humiliated.”242 Researchers have noted that suicide risk is 
highest shortly after treatment begins,243 which could indicate that the shame of 
a new mental illness diagnosis was a contributing cause.244 It could be that laws 
 
238  Alison Milner et al., Suicide in the Absence of Mental Disorder? A Review of 
Psychological Autopsy Studies Across Countries, 59 INT’L J. SOC. PSYCHIATRY 545, 545 
(2012). 
239 As Jesse Bering writes, 
The oft-cited “90%” figure—that 90 percent of suicides are attributable to 
mental illness—is in fact dubious. It’s derived primarily from postmortem 
analyses (‘psychological autopsies’), which are almost certainly subject to 
hindsight bias. When experts are given edited case histories of people who 
died by suicide without knowing they’ve taken their own lives, they are 
far less likely to see a mental illness. 
Jesse Bering, Sometimes, You Won’t Feel Better Tomorrow, SLATE (Feb. 15, 2019), https: 
//slate.com/technology/2019/02/mental-illness-suicide-rational-thought-getting-help.html 
[https://perma.cc/K5K5-JBEU].  
240 Milner et al., supra note 238, at 552. 
241 See Bertolote et al., supra note 234, at 153 (advocating for suicide prevention efforts to 
include treatment for mental health conditions). 
242 See, e.g., David Lester, The Role of Shame in Suicide, 27 SUICIDE & LIFE-THREATENING 
BEHAV. 352, 357 (1997) (noting that, following partial recovery from mental illness, patients 
may experience feelings that increase the chance of suicide). 
243 See, e.g., Nordentoft et al., supra note 231, at 1061 (“The suicide risk [of people age 15 to 
51] increased steeply during the first few years after first contact with psychiatric services.”). 
244 See Megan L. Ranney & Jessica Gold, The Dangers of Linking Gun Violence and Mental 
Illness, TIME (Aug. 7, 2019), https://time.com/5645747/gun-violence-mental-illness [https:// 
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that implicitly label people as dangerous actually heighten the risk of suicide. 
A mental illness gun ban is therefore a blunt instrument in suicide 
prevention efforts that has deeply negative side effects, and a more 
individualized approach would likely see greater success without imposing 
the attendant harms. Extreme risk protection orders are one possibility. These 
laws allow police to remove guns from individuals who are showing signs of 
future violence against themselves or others and have shown some success in 
reducing suicide rates.245 In Connecticut, for example, a judge can issue a 
warrant for the seizure of a person’s guns if there is probable cause to believe 
the individual poses a risk of imminent personal injury to himself or others.246 
The judge considers whether the person has recently made threats; she also can 
look to whether the person has brandished a firearm, used physical force against 
others in the past, been involuntarily committed to a psychiatric facility, or used 
illegal substances.247 One recent study of this law showed that a suicide was 
prevented for every ten to eleven gun seizures that occurred.248  
Another option is to allow individuals to opt in to a waiting period for 
a gun purchase.249 Professor Frederick Vars has proposed allowing people to 
place themselves on a “No-Guns List” that would prohibit them from 
purchasing firearms, which he conceived of as a way for people to protect 
 
perma.cc/M89J-7PG2] (“We have seen patients attempt suicide after a diagnosis of a serious 
mental illness, believing their life was over anyway.”). 
245 Fourteen states and the District of Columbia have passed extreme risk protection order 
laws. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 18125, 18150, 18175 (West, Westlaw through ch. 870 of 2019 
Reg. Sess.); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-38c (West, Westlaw through 2019 Jan. Reg. Sess. 
& 2019 July Spec. Sess.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 7701-09 (West, Westlaw through ch. 
219 of 150th Gen. Assemb. (2019-2020)); 2018 D.C. Code Ann. §§ 7-2510.01 to 7-2510.12 
(West, Westlaw through Nov. 26, 2019); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.401 (West, Westlaw 
through 2019 1st Reg. Sess. of the 26th Leg.); 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.  67/1-80 (West, 
Westlaw through P.A. 101-592); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-47-14-1, -2, -5, -6 -8 (West, 
Westlaw through 2019 1st Reg. Sess. of the 121st Gen. Assemb.); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. 
SAFETY §§ 5-601 to -610 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. of Gen. Assemb.); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, §§ 121, 129B(1 1/2), 131C, 131R-Y (West, Westlaw through ch. 
88 of 2019 1st Ann. Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:58-20 to -32 (West, Westlaw through 
L.2019, c. 267 and J.R. No. 22); N.Y. C.P.L.R.  LAW §§ 6340-47, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.45 
(McKinney 2019); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 166.525-.543 ((LEXIS through 2019 Reg. 
Sess.); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 4051-61 (West, Westlaw through Acts of Reg. Sess. of the 
2019-2020 Vt. Gen. Assemb. (2019)); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 8-8.3-1 to 8-8.3-14 (West, 
Westlaw through ch. 310 of 2019 Reg. Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.94.030, 
7.94.040, 7.94.050, 7.94.080 (West, Westlaw through 2019 Reg. Sess. of the Wash. Leg.). 
246 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-38c. 
247 Id. 
248 Jeffrey Swanson et al., Implementation and Effectiveness of Connecticut’s Risk-Based Gun 
Removal Laws: Does It Prevent Suicides?, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179, 203 (2017). 
249 Frederick Vars, Self-Defense Against Gun Suicide, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1465, 1468 (2015). 
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themselves against suicidal impulses.250 Once on the list, the individual can 
only remove herself after a seven-day waiting period.251 This precommitment 
against suicide both restricts access to lethal means at times of crisis and 
provides individuals with a measure of control over a situation that often 
feels uncontrollable.252 
Proposals like these are tailored to individual situations and respond 
to clear risks. They thus avoid the stigmatizing effect of a blanket ban and 
would likely be a more effective means of suicide prevention.  
 
B. Policy-Based Counterarguments 
 
A few responses to the argument that we should eradicate gun laws 
because they are both ineffective and stigmatizing: First, one might say that 
the stigma against individuals with mental illness predated gun laws and 
would exist even in the absence of such laws, so this change would not reap 
any benefits and would come at the cost of prohibiting some number of 
dangerous people from obtaining firearms. One might also argue that even if 
gun laws prohibiting possession by individuals with mental illness worsen 
stigma, that is still a price worth paying for fewer guns in circulation. A final 
counterargument is that passage of gun safety measures is so difficult that 
half-measures like a mental illness gun ban is the best we will ever do. I 
address each of these counterpoints below. 
 
1. Stigma Will Continue 
 
While it is true that reversing course on guns would not eradicate 
stigma against individuals with mental illness, it would eliminate one of the 
clearest signals that society considers these people dangerous. Delinking guns 
and individuals with mental illness is one of the best tools society has to 
acknowledge that it was wrong in its assumption that mental illness equates 
with violence. 
First, while the dangerousness stigma undoubtedly existed before the 
Gun Control Act and likely was a driver of the prohibitions on possession 
found there, that law legitimates the stigma. Courts and academics have 
recognized the power laws have in this realm.253 When stigma carries the 
 
250 Id. at 1469. 
251 Id. 
252 Id. at 1470-71. 
253 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (“[L]aws excluding same-
sex couples from the marriage right impose stigma and injury . . . .”); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 
347 U.S. 483, 494 (1955) (“Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has 
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legislative stamp of approval, when society’s elective bodies have said “we 
deem you dangerous,” that stigma hardens into truth.  
As one sociologist said in his testimony during a hearing on the 
constitutionality of California’s Proposition 8, a law which had prohibited 
same-sex marriage:  
As we all know, the law in the state is a very important party 
to creating the social environment. So clearly it’s not the only 
thing that determines even experiences of prejudice and 
discrimination, but it is certainly a very major player, major 
factor, in creating this social environment that I described as 
prejudicial or stigmatizing.254  
Second, even if the repeal of a mental illness gun ban does not erase stigma 
altogether, the act of removing the law could begin to drive social change. The 
legislative debate surrounding repeal could force a conversation about the lack 
of connection between mental illness and violence that would itself prove 
illuminating for much of the public. Efforts, even unsuccessful ones, to eradicate 
laws that further bias without accomplishing a societal good can alone do some 
of the work of erasing stigma.255  
Thus, while repeal of gun possession laws targeting individuals with mental 
illness may not entirely solve the problem of stigma, it would at least remove 
society’s imprimatur from the assumption that individuals with mental illness 
 
a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction 
of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the 
inferiority of the negro group.” (citations omitted)); cf. IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: 
THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 78 (1996) (“Races are social products. It follows that 
legal institutions and practices, as essential components of our highly legalized society, have 
had a hand in the construction of race.”); Rafael Efrat, Bankruptcy Stigma: Plausible Causes 
for Shifting Norms, 22 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 481, 496 (2006) (“Legislation has an 
expressive function. Lawmakers regularly enact laws to express social values they attach to 
certain behavior. By applying this expressive function of legislation, legislators act as norm 
entrepreneurs.”); Bruce G. Link & Jo C. Phelan, Conceptualizing Stigma, 27 ANN. REV. 
SOCIOLOGY 363, 378 (2001) (noting that all groups develop stereotypes of other groups, but, 
for the purposes of originating stigma, “what matters is whose cognitions prevail—whose 
cognitions carry sufficient clout in social, cultural, economic, and political spheres to lead to 
important consequences for the group that has been labeled as different”); Susan Yeh, Laws 
and Social Norms: Unintended Consequences of Obesity Laws, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 173, 176 
(2013) (“Where anti-obesity dietary education laws are stricter, social stigma increases for 
obese girls. On the other hand, the education penalty that obese women experience is 
mitigated under anti-obesity laws.”). 
254 Transcript of Proceedings at 880, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. 
Cal. 2010) (No. C 09-2292-VRW). 
255 Cf. Carol Galletly et al., Criminal HIV Exposure Laws: Moving Forward, 18 AIDS 
BEHAV. 1011, 1011-12 (2014) (describing government advisory groups moving from 
recommending circumscribed uses of criminal law to combat HIV to opposing such 
measures outright). 
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pose a danger. At the same time, the debate over repeal itself, even if 
unsuccessful, could change public perceptions of individuals with mental illness. 
 
2. Guns Are Dangerous, and Fewer Guns Is a Good Thing 
 
One might also argue that any correlation with violence—even a weak 
one—is sufficient reason to prohibit possession of a dangerous item like a 
gun. Moreover, preventing certain classes of people from obtaining guns 
keeps the number of these dangerous items in circulation lower than it 
otherwise would be.  
But there are many characteristics that are correlated with violence: 
some studies have indicated that having a military background or living in a 
high-crime neighborhood is just as much a predictor of violence as having a 
serious mental health condition.256 Yet legislators or pundits would never 
speak of banning guns from these groups, even though the benefit of fewer 
guns in circulation would also be realized with those prohibitions. 
Society is more comfortable with banning guns from individuals 
living with mental illness because it fears them, because it sees them as 
other.257 We happily infringe on the rights of this group, even though other 
groups pose roughly the same small risks. Unless and until legislators are 
prepared to also ban guns from other groups minimally correlated with 
violence, then all a mental illness gun ban does is harden the dangerousness 
stigma and worsen all the associated negative effects discussed above.  
In some ways, a mental illness gun ban is more harmful than bans on 
other groups would be. The number of people captured by a mental illness 
gun ban is small, as serious mental illness is relatively rare in the population. 
Stigma can be worse against small groups, where few people know someone 
personally affected by mental illness.258 In addition, individuals living with 
mental health conditions are over twice as likely to be the victims of violent 
crime than other people.259 If one reason to own a gun is to be able to defend 
 
256  See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, A STUDY OF THE PRE-ATTACK BEHAVIORS OF 
ACTIVE SHOOTERS, supra note 41, at 11, 17 (noting that twenty-five percent of active 
shooters had diagnosed mental illnesses, while twenty-four percent had a military 
background); Steadman et al., supra note 91, at 400 (noting that both individuals who lived 
in the comparison neighborhoods and individuals living with mental health conditions had 
elevated rates of violence). 
257 See PERLIN, supra note 32. 
258 See Jennifer E. Boyd et al., The Relationship of Multiple Aspects of Stigma and Personal 
Contact with Someone Hospitalized for Mental Illness, in a Nationally Representative 
Sample, 45 SOC. PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 1063, 1067 (2010). 
259 See, e.g., Virginia Aldigé Hiday et al., Criminal Victimization of Persons with Severe 
Mental Illness, 50 PSYCHIATRIC SERV. 62, 66 (1999) (finding that individuals with severe 
mental illness experienced violent crime at a rate two-and-a-half times higher than the 
general population).  
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oneself, individuals with mental health conditions likely have more of a need 
for guns than others. 
A better solution exists that avoids unnecessarily targeting this 
marginalized group. As I illustrate in more detail below, a ban that shifts from 
a focus on mental illness to one more targeted to behaviors such as past 
violent acts or substance abuse260 would be more effective in capturing the 
group of people who pose a risk, whether they have been diagnosed with 
mental illness or not.261 And if fewer guns on the street is the goal, then such 
a ban prohibits a far broader swath of people from owning a firearm. 
 
3. This Is the Best We Can Do 
 
This approach holds that this wholly inadequate and inapt regulation 
is the best we can possibly do—a position that has neither empirical support 
nor moral force. Two points in response: First, the politics of gun regulation 
are in flux, and positions once thought politically untenable are being 
unapologetically put forward by politicians.262 Moreover, the Supreme Court 
has already blessed the concept of prohibiting dangerous people from 
obtaining guns by implicitly approving prohibitions on individuals with 
mental illness and felons.263 Adjustments to the law that better identify who 
falls into the category of dangerous—one that tags those with violent histories 
and substance abuse problems rather than those who have been confined to a 
mental health facility or adjudicated incompetent—is well within the realm 
of constitutional and political possibility. 
Second, even if there were no prospects for better gun laws, even if this 
was the best we could do, this critique ignores the harm that laws implicitly 
linking mental illness and dangerous behavior are doing right now to individuals 
with a mental health condition. It allows that stigma to continue for the sake of 
keeping laws on the books that do little to actually stem gun violence.  
Ineffective and harmful gun control laws are worse than no gun 
control laws at all, both because they are causing harm without achieving 
substantial benefit and because they may stymie future efforts in this arena. 
The passage of mental illness gun bans—laws that reflect agreement on both 
 
260 While substance abuse disorder is itself a type of mental illness, see DSM-5, supra note 
27, this proposal would focus bans less on the status of mental illness in general and more 
on a specific behavior that is highly correlated with violent acts.  
261 See infra Part V. 
262 See, e.g., German Lopez, How the Parkland Shooting Changed America’s Gun Debate, 
VOX (Dec. 26, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/12/26/18145305/gun-control-violence-
parkland-effect-2018 [https://perma.cc/HZ62-HVTQ] (discussing the increase of politicians 
in 2018 elections who ran on gun control platforms). 
263 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008). 
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sides that individuals with mental illness are dangerous—likely sacrifices 
legislation that would both be more effective and not exacerbate harmful 
prejudices. The instinct to get some gun control, any gun control, passed does 
more harm than good.264 
 
V. TOWARD SMARTER GUN LAWS 
 
If lawmakers continue to focus on mental illness gun bans as a 
solution to gun violence, it will not only be ineffective and stigmatizing, but 
will also distract lawmakers from those risk factors that better predict 
violence.  
Two main categories of individuals have an elevated risk of violence: 
those who have committed violence in the past and those under the influence 
of alcohol or drugs.265 The best predictor of future violence is past violence, 
and studies have shown, again and again, that an individual who has acted 
violently in the past is more likely to do the same in the future.266 One study 
of homicide arrest records in Illinois found that of individuals arrested for 
murder, thirty-seven percent had a previous arrest for a violent crime.267 An 
intervention that dropped the homicide risk of those with a violent arrest to 
that of those without would reduce the homicide rate by 31.7%.268  
Similarly, male handgun purchasers with exactly one violent 
misdemeanor conviction were eight times more likely to be charged with a 
later gun crime or violent crime than a person with no record.269 A handgun 
purchaser with more than one previous violent conviction was ten times more 
likely to be arrested for a violent crime.270  
Substance abuse is also tightly linked to violent acts. As one meta-
 
264 See Marilyn Price et al., Mental Illness and the National Instant Criminal Background 
Check System, in GUN VIOLENCE AND MENTAL ILLNESS 144-45 (Liza H. Gold & Robert I. 
Simon eds., 2016) (“One of the most significant consequences of pursuing such policies is 
that they divert attention from and support for more evidence-based legislative interventions, 
while creating the mistaken perception that ‘something is being done’ to decrease the 
morbidity and mortality of firearm violence.”). 
265 CONSORTIUM FOR RISK-BASED FIREARM POLICY, supra note 222, at 19-20.  
266 Id. 
267 Philip J. Cook et al., Criminal Records of Homicide Offenders, 294 JAMA 598, 599 (2005). 
268 Id. As the authors acknowledge in the study itself, using arrest metrics is a fraught calculus 
because individuals may not be factually guilty of the crime for which they are arrested. But 
an arrest indicates police at least had probable cause that the person committed a violent act, 
which gives support to the thesis that those who have acted violently in the past have a higher 
risk of doing so again in the future. Id. at 600. 
269 Garen J. Wintemute et al., Subsequent Criminal Activity Among Violent Misdemeanants 
Who Seek to Purchase Handguns: Risk Factors and Effectiveness of Denying Handgun 
Purchase, 285 JAMA 1019, 1020 (2001). 
270 Id. 
 Journal of Law & Public Affairs [Jan. 2020 
 
   
 
52  
analysis stated, “the overall impression is fairly convincing, that drug abuse, 
in addition to alcohol abuse, is implicated either as a cause, or as a 
predisposing factor, in violent behavior.”271  
Current federal gun law prohibits some of these individuals from 
obtaining firearms by barring possession by felons, fugitives, persons 
convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, persons subject to a 
domestic violence restraining order, and unlawful users of—or those addicted 
to—a controlled substance.272 Yet expanding the scope of these categories, 
as a coalition of mental health and gun violence prevention experts recently 
suggested, would capture a larger group of individuals with violent pasts or 
who have engaged in substance abuse. This group proposed prohibiting from 
firearms possession: (1) those convicted of a violent misdemeanor; (2) those 
subject to a temporary domestic violence restraining order; (3) those 
convicted of two or more drunk driving offenses in five years; and (4) those 
convicted of two or more misdemeanor crimes involving a controlled 
substance in a period of five years.273  
Lawmakers could go even further and institute a licensing scheme, 
like one in Massachusetts, that allows local licensing authorities to deny gun 
licenses if existing factors (such as multiple domestic violence calls or 
repeated episodes of public drunkenness) suggest the individual presents a 
risk to public safety.274 Extreme risk protection orders, or red flag laws, could 
also allow police to seize guns from individuals who committed violent 
acts—such as making threats or assaulting others—or abused substances, but 
who did not have an arrest or commitment record.275 
When legislators hone in on mental illness as the cause of gun 
violence, they miss opportunities to expand criteria focused on past violence 
and substance abuse. Targeting individuals with mental illness creates the 
sense that the problem is solved. The result has been proposals that tinker with 
 
271 Alfred S. Friedman, Substance Use/Abuse as a Predictor to Illegal and Violent Behavior: 
A Review of the Relevant Literature, 3 AGGRESSIVE & VIOLENT BEHAV. 339, 350 (1998). 
272 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2018). 
273 CONSORTIUM FOR RISK-BASED FIREARM POLICY, supra note 222, at 3. The Consortium 
also recommended maintaining and expanding firearms restrictions for those involuntarily 
hospitalized as mentally ill, id., a position with which this Article disagrees. 
274 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 131(d) (West, Westlaw through ch. 88 of 2019 1st 
Ann. Sess.). These restrictions apply to a license to carry, which allows an individual to 
possess any firearm and concealed carry. If the person is applying for a firearms 
identification card, which allows for possession of certain rifles or shotguns, they must still 
go through the permitting process, but the licensing authority must petition a court to deny 
the license. Id. §§ 129B, 129C. 
275 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 29-38c(b) (West, Westlaw through 2019 Jan. Reg. Sess. 
& 2019 July Spec. Sess.) (allowing a judge to seize a defendant’s weapons if she makes threats, 
brandishes a weapon, or uses illegal substances, among other indicators of dangerousness). 
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the existing system—that strengthen background checks276 or prohibit larger 
groups of individuals with mental illness from obtaining guns277—but will do 
little to stop the tsunami of firearms that continues to wash over the country.278 
Factors such as past violence or substance abuse issues were more 
prevalent than mental health diagnoses in many recent mass shootings. Omar 
Mateen, who killed forty-nine people at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, had 
no mental illness history.279 He passed the background checks required for a 
concealed carry permit and purchased his guns legally.280 But he had a history 
of domestic violence and his wife called police in 2009 after he strangled 
her.281  Expanded prohibitions encompassing past violent acts could have 
prevented his gun purchases. Jared Loughner was found incompetent to stand 
trial after the Tucson shooting,282 but, prior to the shooting, had none of the 
concrete indicators of mental illness required by all possession prohibition 
regimes currently in force. Yet he was arrested in 2007 for drug possession283 
and could have been banned from purchasing a gun under a law expanding 
restrictions on drug users.  
In addition to better preventing mass shootings, violent history and 
substance abuse gun bans would also more effectively capture the small 
subset of individuals with mental health conditions who engage in run-of-the-
mill violence. Analysis of the MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study 
data found that eighty-nine percent of former psychiatric patients who 
 
276  See Bipartisan Background Checks Act of 2019, H.R. Res. 8, 116th Cong. (2019) 
(requiring federal background checks for every gun sale). 
277 WHITE HOUSE, supra note 13. 
278 393 million firearms are in American civilian hands, outpacing the entire U.S. population 
of 326 million people. AARON KARP, SMALL ARMS SURVEY, ESTIMATING GLOBAL CIVILIAN-
HELD FIREARMS NUMBERS  4 (2018). 
279 See Rachel Louise Snyder, Was the Wife of the Pulse Shooter a Victim or an Accomplice?, 
NEW YORKER (Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-wife-of-
the-pulse-night-club-shooter-goes-on-trial [https://perma.cc/Y2BP-DRXT] (describing 
Mateen’s history of domestic violence but not referencing any history of mental illness); see 
also Goldman et al., supra note 174 (describing Mateen’s clean record despite concerns 
about his connection to a terrorist group). 
280 Goldman et al., supra note 174 (“Mateen had a blemish-free record when he applied for 
a Florida license to carry concealed weapons and again when he legally purchased two 
firearms . . . just a few days before the shootings.”). 
281 See Snyder, supra note 279. 
282 Jack Cloherty, et al., Jared Lee Loughner Mentally Incompetent to Stand Trial in Giffords 
Shootings, ABC NEWS (May 25, 2011), https://abcnews.go.com/US/loughner-mentally-
incompetent-stand-trial-giffords-shootings/story?id=13687399 [https://perma.cc/Q4YH-EP5V]. 
283 See, e.g., Marc Lacey et al., Police Stopped Loughner’s Car on Day of Shooting, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 12, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/13/us/politics/13giffords.html 
[https://perma.cc/EWC8-48AA] (detailing the events leading up to Ms. Giffords’ shooting 
and Loughner’s prior arrest); Sulzberger & Medina, supra note 77 (discussing the potential 
effects of the drugs Loughner used on his mental state).  
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committed acts of gun violence had a prior arrest, twice as high as the arrest 
rate of the overall sample.284 Researchers further found that the most violent 
people 285  within the study group were those who were committed for 
substance abuse disorders.286 Not only would expanded substance abuse and 
violent history restrictions continue to ban this sub-group from purchasing 
guns, but it would also prevent those with no mental health records but who 
do have a high risk of future violence from obtaining guns. 
Premising gun bans on substance abuse and past violent acts will 
undoubtedly shift the stigma from individuals with mental illness to these 
groups. Two reasons why this shift would still be preferable to the current 
legal landscape: First, the links between these groups and violence have been 
substantiated by multiple studies, and gun ban schemes focused on these 
groups would actually help to stem American gun violence. All laws 
prohibiting some kind of activity impose stigma, but the stigma is at its most 
problematic when the person may not, or likely does not, possess those 
characteristics being stigmatized.287 If society is to continue to insist only 
dangerous people should not have guns, it will stigmatize some group of 
people as “dangerous,” and our laws should at least focus on groups with the 
largest risks for violent activity.288  
Second, the groups of people who fall into the categories of either 
those with substance abuse problems or those with a record of violence are 
large and widespread, especially when compared with the small group of 
individuals who have experienced serious mental illness.289 Each of us likely 
knows someone with either a substance abuse problem, a history of violence, 
or both, or has fallen into one of these categories at some point in our own 
lives. The effects of stigma would likely not be as devastating when large 
 
284 Steadman et al., supra note 103, at 1240. 
285 I am using “most violent” to mean the nine people in the study who committed an act of 
gun violence against a stranger.  
286 Steadman et al., supra note 103, at 1239. 
287 See, e.g., Roberto Galbiati & Nuno Garoupa, Keeping Stigma Out of Administrative Law: 
An Explanation of Consistent Beliefs, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 273, 273 (2007) (“It is widely 
accepted that a criminal conviction generates more stigma for the convicted party than an 
administrative penalty . . . . [H]igher stigma associated with criminal convictions is justified 
on the grounds that a criminal conviction conveys more reliable information about guilt than 
an administrative one.” (footnote omitted)). 
288 This necessary stigmatization of some group raises the question of whether the laws are 
focused on entirely the wrong question when they attempt to regulate dangerous people 
instead of dangerous weapons. That interesting conversation is, unfortunately, outside the 
scope of this Article. 
289 See, e.g., Swanson et al., supra note 38, at 368 (“Even if the elevated risk of violence in 
people with mental illness were reduced to the average risk in those without mental illness, 
an estimated 96% of the violence that currently occurs in the general population would 
continue to occur.”). 
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portions of the population either share these characteristics or have a personal 
relationship with an individual within the stigmatized group. This conclusion 
is supported by the studies of the impact of personal relationships with 
individuals with mental illness; when a person has a friend or relative living 
with a serious mental illness, she is less likely to want social distance from 
individuals who have been committed to a psychiatric hospital.290 
Because a substance abuse or violent history gun ban would better 
capture a group that poses high risks and the injuries of the associated stigma 
are less acute, these laws would have more benefits and fewer harms than the 
current mental illness gun ban. 291  Such a law would therefore be more 
appropriate than the status quo. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Mental illness gun bans have painted people living with mental health 
conditions with a stigmatizing brush while doing little to stem the tide of gun 
violence in the United States. The harm of these laws—sanctioning the 
prevailing narrative that individuals with mental illness are “dangerous”—far 
outweighs their supposed benefits. The dangerousness narrative has real 
consequences: It makes employers less likely to hire individuals with mental 
illness, landlords less likely to rent to them, and legislators less likely to 
allocate money to programs to serve them. It also makes police more likely 
to arrest or shoot them. 
If these laws were counterbalanced by a clear benefit, if individuals 
with mental illness truly were more likely to act violently and use firearms, 
then their existence would be justified. But this is not the case. The links 
between mental illness and violence are small and murky at best. Moreover, 
the nation’s mental illness gun bans exclude many who exhibit signs of future 
violence while including many who pose no risk. The only tangible 
consequence of these laws is to harden the already strong stigma against 
individuals with mental illness.  
Mental illness gun bans should therefore be repealed. They pin the 
danger label on a group that is not particularly dangerous and distract 
lawmakers from real predictors of violence, such as past violent acts or 
substance abuse. Discarding these laws would thus both lessen the 
dangerousness stigma and its attendant harms and clear the path for gun 
safety laws that would be far more successful at reducing gun violence. 
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291 This argument raises the interesting question of when a law’s harms outweigh its benefits to 
the extent that it should be repealed, which, too, is outside the scope of this Article. But any such 
analysis would surely find that a law that does not accomplish its goal of stemming gun violence, 
while imposing substantial stigma and attendant societal harms, is normatively undesirable.  
